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I. EU Law and Private International Law1 
If private international law is widely considered too technical to stir passions in 
the wider population, such considerations may have to be rethought. Recently, 
people all over Europe took to the streets to protest against a proposed norm of 
private international law – the “country-of-origin” principle stated in Article 16 
of the proposed Services Directive.2 Had the proposal become law, providers 
                                                 
1  In this article, I use “private international law” rather than “conflict of laws” or 
“choice of law” for two reasons. First, this is in accordance with European usage. 
Second, it brings out the focus on private interest that characterizes the country of ori-
gin principle better than “conflict of laws” or “choice of law”, both of which suggest 
that the relevant question goes to which of several laws is applicable.  
2  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on services in 
the internal market (by the Commission), 5 March 2004, COM(2004) 2 final/3, Article 
16, “Country of origin principle”:  
(1) Member States shall ensure that providers are subject only to the national provisi-
ons of their Member State of origin which fall within the coordinated field. 
Paragraph 1 shall cover national provisions relating to access to and the exercise of 
a service activity, in particular those requirements governing the behaviour of the 
provider, the quality or content of the service, advertising, contracts and the pro-
vider's liability. 
(2) The Member State of origin shall be responsible for supervising the provider and 
the services provided by him, including services provided by him in another Mem-
ber State. 
(3) Member States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict 
the freedom to provide services in the case of a provider established in another 
Member State, in particular, by imposing any of the following requirements: 
(a) an obligation on the provider to have an establishment in their territory; 
(b) an obligation on the provider to make a declaration or notification to, or to ob-
tain an authorisation from, their competent authorities, including entry in a re-
gister or registration with a professional body or association in their territory; 
(c) an obligation on the provider to have an address or representative in their terri-
tory or to have an address for service at the address of a person authorized in 
that territory; 
(d) a ban on the provider setting up a certain infra structure in their territory, inclu-
ding an office or chambers, which the provider needs to supply the services in 
question; 
(e) an obligation on the provider to comply with requirements, relating to the exer-
cise of a service activity, applicable in their territory; 
(f) the application of specific contractual arrangements between the provider and 
the recipient which prevent or restrict service provision by the self-employed; 
(g) an obligation on the provider to possess an identity document issued by its 
competent authorities specific to the exercise of a service activity; 
(h) requirements which affect the use of equipment which is an integral part of the 
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of services would now be governed largely by the laws of their countries of 
origin alone, and the application of rules of the country of destination would be 
severely restricted. Protests against this norm were an important reason why 
the EU Constitutional Treaty failed in referenda in France and in the Nether-
lands, and why the Commission has replaced the country-of-origin principle 
with a much milder principle of mutual recognition.3 
But is the country-of-origin principle a private international law norm at all? 
It is hard to say, since the relationship between private international law and EU 
law is still somewhat undefined. Indeed, for a long time, scholars in both areas 
worked in splendid isolation from each other. To private international lawyers, 
EU law sometimes appeared on the periphery as a minor nuisance, but it could 
mostly be ignored.4 The new EU competence for private international law ex-
pressed in Articles 61, 65 of the EU Treaty5 has not changed much in this re-
                                                                                                                                                      
service provided; 
(i) restrictions on the freedom to provide the services referred to in Article 20, the 
first subparagraph of Article 23(1) or Article 25(1). 
3  Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Services in the Internal Market (presented by the Commission), 4 April 2006, 
COM(2006) 160 final, Article 16 with comments at pp. 10-12. 
4  But see, for some early analyses, René Savatier, « Le Marché Commun au regard du 
droit international privé » (1959) Rev crit 237; id., « Les aspects du droit international 
privé de la Communauté Économique », in: Travaux du Comité Français de droit in-
ternational privé 1960-1962, 17; Konrad Zweigert, « Einige Auswirkungen des Ge-
meinsamen Marktes auf das internationale Privatrecht der der Mitgliedstaaten », in: 
Ernst von Cammerer et al. (eds.), Probleme des europäischen Rechts. Festschrift für 
Walter Hallstein zu seinem 65. Geburtstag (1966) 555. For two recent accounts of the 
history, see Jannet A. Pontier, Europees conflictenrecht – Een complexe geschiedenis 
in vogelvlucht (Amsterdam, Vossiuspers, 2005); Karl Kreuzer, „Zu Stand und Per-
spektiven des Europäischen Internationalen Privatrechts – Wie europäisch soll das Eu-
ropäische Internationale Privatrecht sein?“ 70 (2006) RabelsZ 1, 8-30 (2006). For an 
argument to treat all EU law as conflict of laws, see Christian Joerges, “The Challen-
ges of Europeanization in the Realm of Private Law: A Plea for a New Legal Discipli-
ne” (2004) 14 Duke International and Comparative Law Journal 149; Andreas Furrer, 
Zivilrecht im gemeinschaftsrechtlichen Kontext – Das Europäische Kollisionsrecht als 
Koordinierungsinstrument für die Einbindung des Zivilrechts in das europäische 
Wirtschaftsrecht (2001); Christoph Schmid, Die Instrumentalisierung des Privatrechts 
durch die EU (Baden-Baden, Nomos, forthcoming). 
5  Arts 61, 65 Treaty establishing the European Community, 2002 OC C-325/59 (24 De-
cember 2002); see Jürgen Basedow, “The Communitarization of the Conflict of Laws 
under the Treaty of Amsterdam” (2000) 37 Common Market Law Review 687; Oliver 
Remien, “European Private International Law, the European Community and Its E-
merging Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” (2001) 38 Common Market Law Re-
view 53. 
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spect, since what the EU legislates in this realm is, in shape and approach, 
widely compatible with traditional private international law.6 For EU lawyers, 
by contrast, private international law, with all its expertise, was no more than a 
small and negligible field of technical niceties that was not expected to, and 
mostly did not, stand in the way of the common market and its law. 
If such happy co-existence (or rather: mutual ignorance) was ever possible, 
it no longer is. Traditional private international law and EU law clash with 
ever-increasing frequency. The infamous “country-of-origin principle” does 
not pose the only challenge to traditional private international law; other chal-
lenges come from the rules on non-discrimination.7 Yet, private international 
lawyers have not found an adequate response; they still struggle, even at a con-
ceptual level, with the need to make sense of EU law. Many conflicts scholars 
react in one of two ways. Some complain that European law develops in igno-
rance of private international law. While this complaint is not entirely unjusti-
fied, the consequence that they often draw – to leave private international law 
unaltered – seems both unrealistic and unattractive. Other private international 
lawyers concede defeat and suggest (or deplore) a reformulation of private in-
ternational law in the face of EU law, replacing the traditional conflicts norm 
with a principle of mutual recognition.8 In doing this, they seem too willing to 
concede that after centuries their own discipline has lost its relevance. 
Both reactions are equally unsatisfactory. Since both fail to make the coun-
try-of-origin principle and private international law commensurable, they yield 
the opportunity for private international law to contribute its disciplinary 
knowledge and expertise to debates about the common market. As a conse-
quence, EU law has been able to develop in this area, largely unchallenged by 
                                                 
6  But see Jürgen Basedow, « Spécificité et coordination du droit international privé 
communautaire », in Travaux du comité français de droit international privé 2002-
2004 (Paris, Pédone, 2005), 275 (arguing that federalized codification of private inter-
national law is a novelty). 
7  E.g. for the private law of names in case of double nationality: Case C-148/02 Garcia 
Avello, decision of October 2, 2003, [2003] ECR-I 11613; Case C-96/04 Stadt Nie-
büll, Opinion of the Advocate General of June 30, 2005, paras 56-7. (The Court of 
Justice decided on April 27, 2006 it had no jurisdiction over the case.) Avello is inter-
preted as a return to Savignyan private international law by Tito Ballarino & Benedet-
ta Ubertazzi, “On Avello and Other Judgments: A New Departure in the Conflict of 
Laws?”(2004) Yearbook of Private International Law 85, 124-9. 
8 See Erik Jayme & Kohler, „Europäisches Kollisionsrecht 2001: Anerkennungsprinzip 
statt IPR?“ (2001) IPRax 501; Paul Lagarde, „Développements futures du droit inter-
national privé dans une Europe en voie d’unification: quelques conjectures“ (2004) 68 
RabelsZ 225; Dagmar Coester-Waltjen, „Das Anerkennungsprinzip im Dornröschen-
schlaf?“, in: H. P. Mansel (ed.), Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 121. 
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private international lawyers; in the “contest of legal disciplines”,9 EU law so 
far holds the upper hand. I suggest instead that private international lawyers 
should recognize the debate about EU law as one that plays out in the heart of 
their own discipline, as one to which they have much to contribute because of 
their own specific experience. However, this requires them to broaden their 
view. Ironically, some of the fully justified criticism against EU scholars – 
they do not understand private international law – falls back on private-
international-law scholars themselves. Many of them are too quick to equate 
their discipline with a specific approach, the post-Savignyan approach that is 
currently prevailing.10 
Once we take a broader perspective we find that the country-of-origin prin-
ciple displays a remarkable degree of similarities to an old approach that has 
almost been forgotten. This approach is known as the vested rights theory. Pri-
vate international lawyers can be excused for not thinking of that theory when 
they look at the country-of-origin principle. After all, the vested rights theory 
has been as thoroughly discarded as any theory ever has, while the country-of-
origin principle, despite its recent setback in the Services Directive, seems 
alive and well. However, this difference does not suggest that both are incom-
parable; it suggests only how the force of any criticism is contingent upon the 
framework within which a theory works. Indeed, comparing both the theories 
and the respective criticism against it teaches us a lot about both the vested 
rights theory and about the country-of-origin principle, and it helps us towards 
a fuller understanding of European private international law. 
This paper makes these three claims: 
(1) The country-of-origin principle in EU law is best understood by analo-
gizing it to the vested rights theory in private international law. 
(2) The country-of-origin principle can counter most of the challenges that 
brought the vested rights theory down. 
(3) Contemporary European private international law is characterized by 
the lasting tension between traditional private international law and the 
country-of-origin principle. This tension creates the flexibility that is 
both appropriate and necessary for private international law to play its 
                                                 
9  Joerges, supra n. 4, 154. For the origin of the quote, see Immanuel Kant, “The Contest 
of Faculties”, in: H. S. Reiss (ed.), Kant – Political Writings (2nd ed. 1991) (Der Streit 
der Fakultäten [1798]). 
10  For Savigny’s continued (or renewed) importance, see Matthias Reimann, “Savigny's 
Triumph? Choice of Law in Contracts Cases at the Close of the Twentieth Century” 
(1999) 39 Virgina Journal of International Law 571; Ralf Michaels, “Globalizing 
Savigny?”, http://ssrn.com/abstract=796228. 
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role in the evolving common market. 
These claims are addressed in turn. Part II substantiates the first claim, the 
similarity between the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle. 
This Part first presents different variants of vested rights theories before point-
ing out the numerous similarities with the country-of-origin principle and these 
theories. Part III substantiates the second claim, the resilience of the country-
of-origin principle against the criticism brought forward against the vested 
rights theory. It first shows the different arguments brought forward against the 
vested rights theory and shows how they are rehashed in the debate about the 
country-of-origin principle, before demonstrating that they all fail, more or 
less, with regard to the country-of-origin principle. Part IV, the conclusion, is 
devoted to the third claim, regarding the lasting tension in European private 
international law between different methods and policies. Instead of rejecting 
these tensions, that Part argues that we should embrace them as fertile for a 
developing area of the law. First, however, the remainder of this Part I presents 
the conflict between the country-of-origin principle and traditional private in-
ternational law, as well as the different proposals that have been made to con-
ceptualize the relationship before concluding that a broader concept of private 
international law is needed for this conceptualization. 
A. Practical Conflicts 
That private international law and the country-of-origin principle indeed con-
flict can be seen from either side of the disciplinary divide – from the side of 
European private international law, and from the side of secondary and pri-
mary EU law. 
1. Private-International-Law Regulations 
Within private international law, the potential clash with EU law was slow to 
emerge. The Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable to contractual 
obligations contains only a provision in its Article 20 that gives priority to 
choice-of-law rules in EU legislation.11 Conflicts with norms of EU law not 
                                                 
11 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Consolidated Ver-
sion), O.J. C 27, 26/)1/1998, p. 34. Article 20 reads: “This Convention shall not affect 
the application of provisions which, in relation to particular matters, lay down choice-
of-law rules relating to contractual obligations and which are or will be contained in 
acts of the institutions of the European Communities or in national laws harmonized 
in implementation of such acts.” 
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shaped as private-international-law rules were apparently not considered. Since 
1980, the possibility of such conflicts has become clearer to the Commission, 
but not easier to solve. The Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Con-
vention of 2002 still tried to shirk the issue: 
The present document does not intend to examine the relationship between a 
possible future instrument and the Internal Market rules. For the Commission 
it is clear, however, that such an instrument should leave intact the principles 
of the Internal Market laid down in the Treaty or in secondary legislation.12 
By contrast, the 2003 preliminary draft proposal for a Regulation on the law 
applicable to non-contractual obligations (“Rome II”) includes an explicit pro-
vision regarding the conflict in its Article 23(2): 
This regulation shall not prejudice the application of Community instruments 
which, in relation to particular matters and in areas coordinated by such in-
struments, subject the supply of services or goods to the laws of the Member 
State where the service-provider is established and, in the area coordinated, al-
low restrictions on freedom to provide services or goods originating in another 
Member State only in limited circumstances.13 
Finally, in the most recent versions, Article 22(c) of the Rome I Proposal14 and 
Article 3(d) of the Rome II Proposal15 both read, 
This Regulation shall not prejudice the application or adoption of acts of the 
institutions of the European Communities which … lay down rules to promote 
the smooth operation of the internal market, where such rules cannot apply at 
the same time as the law designated by the rules of private international law. 
Several developments are observable. First, the problem of a potential conflict 
between private international law norms and principles of the internal market, 
                                                 
12 Green Paper on the conversion of the Rome Convention of 1980 on the law applicable 
to contractual obligations into a Community instrument and its modernisation, 
COM(2002) 654 final, 14 January 2003, p. 5. The French version is more strict and 
uses the word devra (“will have to”), this stricter use can also be found in the draft 
proposal for the Services Directive (supra n. 2) at p 17, which, when quoting the 
Green Paper, replaces “should” with “must”. 
13 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 22 July 2003, COM(2003) 
427 final. 
14 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) (presented by the Commission), 15 
December 2005, COM(2005) 650 final. 
15 Amended proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Law 
Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (“Rome II”), 21 Feb 2006, COM(2006) 83 
final. 
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including the country-of-origin principle has been recognized and acknowl-
edged only gradually. Second, the scope of the exception from private interna-
tional law has grown over time. Whereas the Rome Convention makes such an 
exception only for explicit private international law, and the 2003 Rome II 
proposal was aimed only at specific directives, the current texts are apparently 
not limited in scope. Third, the expansion of scope coincides with a diminution 
of clarity. Whereas the Rome Convention is clear in its focus on explicit pri-
vate-international-law norms, and the 2003 Rome II proposal was clear at least 
in its focus on specific instruments,16 the current text gives no guidelines as to 
how exactly the exception should be delimited. Do not nearly all acts of EU 
law “lay down rules to promote the smooth operation of the internal market”? 
How can it be the case that “such rules cannot apply at the same time as the 
law designated by the rules of private international law”? After all, the private-
international-law regulations themselves must be “necessary for the proper 
functioning of the internal market” if the EU wants to claim competence under 
Article 65 of the EC Treaty.17 Indeed, the regulations are repeatedly justified 
as necessary for the functioning of the internal market.18 How can they at the 
same time be in conflict with this market? 
2. The Country-of-Origin Principle in Directives 
If EU legislation on private international law is unclear regarding its relationship 
with the country-of-origin principle, EU legislation providing for such a princi-
ple is hardly clearer regarding its relationship to traditional private international 
law. Some older directives, like the television-without-frontiers directive of 
                                                 
16 But see, for criticism, Hamburg Group for Private International Law, “Comments on 
the European Commission’s Draft Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Law Ap-
plicable to Non-Contractual Obligations”, (2003) 67 RabelsZ 1, 54-55. 
17  Whether Article 65 is an appropriate basis for private international law legislation or 
whether such legislation must be based on Articles 94, 95 of the Treaty, is irrelevant 
for purposes of this argument, since both make it a condition that private international 
law regulations are in fact necessary for the functioning of the internal market. This is 
not the subject of this article; see, for two recent critical views, Paul R. Beaumont, 
“Private international law of the European Union: competence questions arising from 
the proposed Rome II regulation on choice of law in non-contractual obligations”, in 
Private Law, Private International Law and Judicial Cooperation in the EU-US Rela-
tionship (CILE Studies Vol 2, 2005), 15; Andrew Dickinson, “European Private Inter-
national Law: Embracing New Horizons or Mourning the Past?” (2005) 1 Journal of 
Private International Law 197. 
18 See Rome I Proposal, supra n. 14, Recitals 1, 4; Amended Rome II Proposal, supra 
n. 15, Recitals 1, 4. 
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1989, include provisions restricting the country of destination from applying its 
own law to service providers from other Member States, but the relationship to 
private international law is not addressed.19 The E-Commerce Directive of 
200020 revealed that the Commission was aware of the problem but utterly un-
able to resolve it. Article 3 of the directive provides that, within the coordinated 
field, information service providers need comply only with the provisions of the 
member state where they are established (Article 3(1)), while other Member 
States may not, for reasons falling within the coordinated field, restrict the free-
dom to provide information services from another Member State (Article 3(2), 
and the destination country may derogate from this only for purposes of public 
policy, public health, public security, and the protection of consumers and inves-
tors (Article 13(4)). This looks like a private-international-law norm that de-
clares the laws of the country of establishment applicable and the laws of the 
country of destination inapplicable except when these conflict with specific pub-
lic policy. Yet mysteriously, Article 1(4) of the Directive proclaims that “[t]his 
Directive does not establish additional rules on private international law nor 
does it deal with the jurisdiction of Courts.”21 This apparent internal inconsis-
tency has led to an intense (and largely inconclusive) debate about whether the 
country-of-origin principle in Article 3 “really” is a private-international-law 
rule or not.22 Regardless of such doctrinal debates, the country-of-origin princi-
                                                 
19 Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the co-ordination of certain pro-
visions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States con-
cerning the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (O.J. 1989 L 298/23); 
amended by Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 
June 1997, (1997) O.J. L 202/60. On the scope of the country-of-origin principle, see 
ECJ 9 July 1997, Joined cases C-34/95, C-35/95, and C-36/95; Konsumentombuds-
mannen KO v. De Agostini (Svenska) Forlag AB; Konsumentbodsmannen v. TV 
Shop i Sverige AB. For characterization as a private international law norm, see Ale-
xander Thünken, “Multistate Advertising over the Internet and the Private Internatio-
nal Law of Unfair Competition” (2002) 51 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 909, 939. 
20 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic com-
merce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), 2000 O.J. L 178/1. 
21 See also recital 23: “This Directive neither aims to establish additional rules on private 
international law relating to conflicts of law nor does it deal with the jurisdiction of 
Courts; provisions of the applicable law designated by rules of private international 
law must not restrict the freedom to provide services as established in this Directive.” 
22  See only Peter Mankowski, „Das Herkunftslandprinzip als Internationales Privatrecht 
der E-Commerce-Richtlinie“, 100 Zeitschrift für vergleichende Rechtswissenschaft 
137 (2001); Stefan Grundmann, „Das Internationale Privatrecht der E-Commerce-
Richtlinie – was ist kategorial anders im Kollisionsrecht des Binnenmarkts und wa-
rum?“ (2003) 67 RabelsZ 246; Gert de Baere, „’Is this a Conflict Rule which I see Be-
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ple in the directive has real implications for private international law: In 2003, 
the Court of Justice decided, regarding a private litigation, that German courts 
cannot apply certain German rules against the sale and advertising of non-
prescription medicines, even though these rules would be applicable under a 
normal choice-of-law analysis.23 
The proposed Services Directive finally has moved the problem to the cen-
tre of attention. In Article 16(1) of its 2004 proposal, the Commission went 
beyond adopting a country-of-origin principle only for a coordinated area and 
required that service providers generally should have to comply only with the 
rules of their countries of origin.24 Article 19 includes an exception clause for 
matters of safety, health profession, and public policy. Had this become law, it 
would have created an unavoidable clash with traditional private-international-
law norms, which regularly designate laws other than that of the country of 
origin as applicable: the law of the affected market,25 of the consumer’s habit-
ual residence,26 or of the place of the injury.27 Would these rules, or the results 
of their application, constitute restrictions of the freedom to provide services? 
The Commission seemed to assume that these rules would play only a residual 
role.28 Largely, private-international-law rules for contracts entered into, and 
                                                                                                                                                      
fore Me?’ Looking for a Hidden Conflict Rule in the Principle of Origin as Imple-
mented in Primary European Community Law and in the ‚Directive on Electronic 
Commerce“, (2004) 11 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 287, 
305-317; Olivier Cachard, “Le domaine coordonné par la directive sur le commerce 
électronique et le droit international privé”, (2004) International Business Law Jour-
nal 161; all with further references. 
23  Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband eV v. 0800 DocMorris NV and Jacques 
Waterval, [2003] ECR I-14887; English case note by Richard Lang at (2005) 42 
Common Market Law Review 189; see also Christofer Lenz, « Warenverkehrsfreiheit 
nach der DocMorris-Entscheidung zum Versand von Arzneimitteln » 2004 Neue Ju-
ristische Wochenschrift 332; Elmar Mand, „E-Commerce mit Arzneimitteln – Aus-
wirkungen des Herkunftslandprinzips auf das Internationale Wettbewerbsrecht“ 2003 
Multimediarecht 77. 
24 Supra n. 2. 
25 See Dieter Martiny, „Die Anknüpfung an den Markt“, in: Festschrift für Ulrich Drob-
nig zum siebzigsten Geburtstag (1998) 389. 
26 Rome I Proposal, supra n. 14, Article 5(1).  
27  Amended Rome II Proposal, supra n. 15, Article 5(1). 
28  See Services Directive Proposal, supra n. 2, p. 17 (under the slightly ironic heading of 
“Coherence with other Community Policies”): “they could, however, play an impor-
tant role not only for the activities which are not covered by this Directive but also for 
the questions which are the object of derogations to the country-of-origin principle, 
notably the derogation in relation to contracts concluded by consumers, as well as the 
derogation relating to the non-contractual liability of the provider in the case of an ac-
cident occurring in the context of his activity which affects a person in a Member 
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torts committed by, services providers would remain inapplicable.29 
After stark protest from numerous sides, including the European Parlia-
ment, the Commission has now replaced the country-of-origin principles in Ar-
ticle 16 with a milder provision requiring Member States to grant the freedom 
to provide services, a provision that looks much less like a private-
international-law norm.30 Furthermore, Article 17(20) now provides an explicit 
exception for “provisions regarding contractual and non-contractual obliga-
tions, including the form of contracts, determined pursuant to the rules of pri-
vate international law.” A similar change took place between the first proposal 
and the final version of the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive. Whereas 
the 2003 proposal included a country-of-origin rule very similar to Article 16 
of the Services Directive,31 the final directive states a mere internal market 
rule.32 The scope for traditional private law is therefore widened, but the rela-
tionship remains unclear. 
3. Primary Law and the Law of Corporations 
These questions are not restricted to secondary instruments. A third, well-
known example concerns the impact of primary law on the private interna-
tional law of corporations. The Court of Justice addressed these issues in its 
case trilogy in Centros, Überseering, and Inspire Art.33 In Centros, the Court of 
                                                                                                                                                      
State which a provider visits.” 
29  See also Jürgen Basedow, „Herkunftslandsprinzip und Internationales Privatrecht im 
europäischen Binnenmarkt für Dienstleistungen“, in: Rozprawy prawnicze. Księga 
pamiątkowa Profesora Maksymiliana Pazdana (Zakamycze 2005), 29, 41-42. 
30 Supra n. 3; for criticism, see Editorial Comment, (2006) 43 Common Market Law Re-
view 307. 
31 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning 
unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market (the unfair 
commercial practices Directive), 17 June 2003, COM(2003) Article 4. 
32 Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market 
and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 
2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 
2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Prac-
tices Directive’), (2005) O.J. L 149/22 (11 June 2005; see Jules Stuyck, Evelyne Ter-
ryn, Tom van Dyck, “Confidence through fairness? The new Directive on unfair busi-
ness-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market” (2006) 43 Common 
Market Law Review 107, 117-120. 
33 Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs- og Selskabsstyrelsen, decision of 3/9/1999, 
(1999) ECR I-1459; Case C-208/00, Überseering B.V. v. Nordic Construction Com-
pany Baumanagement GmbH (NCC), decision of 11/5/2002, 2000, ECR I-9919; Case 
  11
Justice ordered Denmark to register the subsidiary of a corporation that two 
Danish citizens had registered under English law, although their only reason 
for using UK law had been to avoid the registration fees for Danish companies 
under Danish law. In Überseering, the Court held that Germany could not deny 
a corporation registered under Dutch law the capacity to sue in Germany, even 
if the company lacked legal capacity under German law, since it did not com-
ply with the German laws applicable under German private international law. 
Finally, in Inspire Art, the Court made clear that the Netherlands could not im-
pose additional requirements on a corporation registered under UK law on the 
basis that it was a “pseudo foreign corporation”, although that was exactly 
what the corporation in question was, never having conducted any business 
outside the Netherlands. 
This case law makes it possible to register a company in country A even if 
that company conducts its entire business in country B, although the private-
international-law rules of many Member States require a more genuine link to 
the country of registration for recognition of a corporation’s full legal capacity. 
Although this case law therefore creates an obvious tension with private inter-
national law, its precise impact on private international law is not clear. The 
Court of Justice never addressed the questions posed as question of choice of 
law, but instead resolved them under Arts. 43 and 48 of the EC Treaty. Indeed, 
some have argued that this case law applies only on the level of substantive 
law and leaves private-international-law norms intact. Nonetheless, for the 
highest courts in Austria and in Germany these decisions became the impetus 
to shift their private-international-law norms from a real-seat principle to a reg-
istration principle.34 
Whether such a modification was required by the case law is far from clear. 
Still unresolved, at least from a private international law perspective, is the 
relevance of the earlier decision in Daily Mail, where the Court had held, 
sweepingly, that “companies are creatures of the law and, in the present state 
of Community law, creatures of national law. They exist only by virtue of the 
varying national legislation which determines their incorporation and function-
                                                                                                                                                      
C-167/01, Kamer van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v. Inspire Art Ltd., 
decision of 9/30/2003, 2003 ECR I-10155. 
34 Oberster Gerichtshof (Austria), decision of 7/15/1999, (1999) Österreichisches Recht 
der Wirtschaft 719; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 13 March 2003 – VII 
ZR 370/98, 154 BGHZ 185; Bundesgerichtshof (Germany), decision of 14 March 
2005 – II ZR 5/03, (2005) Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 805; see also the contributi-
on by Federal Court judge Wulf Goette, „Zu den Folgen der Anerkennung ausländi-
scher Gesellschaften mit tatsächlichem Sitz im Inland für die Haftung ihrer Gesell-
schafter und Organe“, (2006) 27 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) 541. 
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ing.”35 In the case this meant that English law could determine that an English 
company could lose its legal personality if it transferred its administrative seat 
away from England. That Daily Mail has never been overruled36 leads to an 
apparent inconsistency: The freedoms of the EU Treaty allow a company 
founded under the law of Member State A to transfer its seat to Member State 
B regardless of the law of State B, but not regardless of the law of Member 
State A. It seems as though the law of State B has to comply with rigid re-
quirements from EU law, while Member State A is free to do as it pleases. 
What looks like an inconsistency for EU law is also a problem for private in-
ternational law.37 Daily Mail seemed to suggest that EU law has no impact on 
the conflict of laws because it explicitly made the recognition of companies 
contingent on the applicable national law. The Centros trilogy, on the other 
hand, seems to suggest a significant impact. 
4. Three Kinds of Conflict 
The conflict between the country-of-origin principle and traditional private in-
ternational law has three dimensions: a substantive, an institutional, and a 
methodological dimension. 
The substantive conflict is a conflict between different sets of connecting 
factors.38 The country-of-origin principle, regardless of whether it “is” a pri-
vate-international-law rule or not, conflicts with the application of traditional 
of private international law simply because the latter often designate the law of 
the country of destination as applicable. Consumer contracts, for example, are 
governed by the law of the passive consumer’s habitual residence, which is not 
the country of origin for a foreign provider. In tort law, in the proposed Rome 
II Regulation, as in the vast majority of national legal systems, the applicable 
                                                 
35  Case No. 81/87, The Queen v Treasury and Commissioners of Inland Revenue, ex 
parte Daily Mail and GeneralTrust [1988] ECR 5483, no. 19; similarly Lea Brilmayer, 
Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1995) 242. 
36  But see now Case No C-446/03, 13 December 2005, Marks & Spencer Plc v. Halsey 
(Inspector of Taxes) [2006] Ch. 184 (ECJ), [2006] CMLR 18; Case No C-411-03, 
SEVIC Systems AG, 13 December 2005 [2006] 1 CMLR 45 no. 18. These newer de-
cisions seems to suggest that the Court considers a discrimination between corpora-
tions acting within the founding state and corporations acting transnationally can con-
stitute a violation of Articles 43, 48.  
37 Wulf-Henning Roth, „Internationales Gesellschaftsrecht nach Überseering“ 2003 
IPRax 117, 121. 
38 Miguel Virgós Soriano/Francisco J. Garcimartín Alférez, « Estado de origen v. estado 
de destino – Las diferentes lógicas del Derecho internacional privado” InDret 4/2004 
(No 251) 2, available at http://www.indret.com/pdf/251_es.pdf. 
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law is the law of the place of the injury. Again, if, for example, a provider of 
TV reports sitting in Member State A defames a prominent person in State B, 
the country-of-origin (State A) and the place of the injury (State B) do not co-
incide. In general, for regulatory laws like laws of commercial advertising, 
etc., the typical approach is to apply the law of the country whose market has 
been targeted, while a country-of-origin principle restricts that country’s law. 
And in private international law for companies, where many countries apply 
the law of the place of the administrative seat, a similar disconnect occurs. A 
country-of-origin principle will therefore often clash with choice-of-law rules 
because both designate the rules of different legal systems as applicable. The 
European legislator tries to address this problem by carving out exceptions. 
Thus, on the one hand, consumer contracts were excepted from the proposed 
Services Directive,39 on the other hand, media liability was excepted from the 
Rome II Regulation.40 Such an issue by issue approach cannot resolve the fun-
damental conflict; in fact, because it is unprincipled, it may rather serve to ex-
acerbate it. 
This substantive conflict is enhanced by three institutional conflicts. Within 
the European Commission, it reflects the infamous dispute between the Direc-
torate General Internal Market on the one hand, favouring a country-of-origin 
principle, and the Directorate General Justice and Home Affairs on the other, 
defending traditional private international law.41 At the same time, it reflects a 
more general institutional conflict between the Commission and the Member 
States. The Commission favours an approach that enhances legislative compe-
tition and restricts the Member States’ ability to discriminate against non-
nationals, while the Member States favour private-international-law rules that 
allow them to maintain their regulatory competences. Finally, a quasi-
institutional conflict should not be neglected – that between scholars of private 
international law and scholars of European Union law. The methodological 
approach of those writers who are influential will influence, in turn, how the 
relationship between the fields develops in the future. 
                                                 
39 Services Directive Proposal, supra n. 3, Article 3(2). This means that Art. 5 EC Con-
vention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations should prevail over the di-
rective. The fate of the choice of law provisions in EC directives on consumer law is 
less clear. 
40 Amended Rome II Proposal, supra n. 15, Article 1(2)(h). 
41 Christian Kohler, „Verständigungsschwierigkeiten zwischen europäischem Gemein-
schaftsrecht und internationalem Privatrecht“, in: Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 
445, 457-9; Jürgen Basedow, „EC Conflict of Laws – A Matter of Coordination“, in: 
Seminàrio Internacional sobre a Comunitarizaçao do Direito Internacional Privado 
(Almedina 2005) 17, 26. 
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This quasi-institutional, disciplinary conflict translates easily into the third 
conflict, with which this paper deals primarily: the methodological conflict be-
tween European law on the one hand and private international law on the other. 
Is the country-of-origin principle chiefly a rule of European law that leaves 
private international law intact? Or does it rather replace private international 
law entirely? Does it force private international law to adopt new rules? Or 
even a new methodology? And can private international law, in turn, be influ-
ential in any way on the country-of-origin principle itself? To answer these 
questions, it is first necessary to analyze what the relationship between the two 
fields actually is. 
B. Theoretical Accounts of the Relationship 
What, then, is the relationship between the country-of-origin principle on the 
one hand, and private international law on the other? The literature provides 
essentially five different concepts. 
1. Country-of-Origin Principle as a Rule Designating the Applicable 
Law 
First is the view that the country-of-origin principle represents an actual private-
international-law rule that designates the applicable law. The most obvious 
problem this vies must overcome is that the principle does not look like a pri-
vate-international-law rule that designates an applicable law; it only prohibits 
the application of restrictive host country norms in addition to those of the coun-
try-of-origin.42 As a consequence, a certain degree of translation is required. 
A first problem with such a translation concerns the structure of the result-
ing rule. The country-of-origin principle does not simply designate the appli-
cable law. Rather, it restricts applicability of the law designated by traditional 
private international law rules if they are more restrictive than those of the 
country of origin. If the law of the country of destination places restrictions in 
addition to those of the country-of-origin, then it is inapplicable as a violation 
of the country-of-origin principle. If, on the other hand, the law of the country 
of destination is less restrictive than that of the country-of-origin, it is not in-
hibited from applying its less restrictive law. If the rules are less restrictive, the 
                                                 
42  Cf. Julio D. González Campos, « La Cour de Justice des Communautés Européennes 
et le non-Droit international privé », in : Festschrift für Erik Jayme I (2004) 263 
(2004). 
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principle is not violated. To translate this into a private international norm re-
quires a special kind of norm, a Günstigkeitsprinzip, whereby the less restric-
tive of the laws of origin and those of destination applies.43  
The bigger challenge for such a translation is the fact that the connecting 
factors used in the principle are different from those in traditional private in-
ternational law. Thus, it has been suggested that the principle departs from the 
territorial approach dominant in contemporary private international law and 
follows rather a personalised approach, congenial to medieval private interna-
tional law.44 “Origin” in country-of-origin would then come to equal “origo”, 
the traditional connecting factor dismissed by Savigny.45 This is not unusual; it 
would be a challenge only for strictly territorial conceptions of private interna-
tional law. The bigger problem is that the connecting factor used by the princi-
ple – the country-of-origin – frequently does not represent the closest connec-
tion and thus does not fulfil the general requirement of traditional private-
international-law norms, territorial or otherwise.46 In other words: translated 
into a private-international-law rule, the content of the country-of-origin prin-
ciple is hard to justify in the light of general values held within the field. 
2. No Impact at all on Private International Law 
The opposite view is that the country-of-origin principle has no impact on pri-
vate international law at all. This view, expressed in Article 1(4) of the E-
Commerce Directive,47 was once nearly unanimously held and is still wide-
spread.48 According to this view, the country-of-origin principle works on the 
level of substantive law only; it leaves the determination of the applicable law 
                                                 
43 Jürgen Basedow, „Der kollisionsrechtliche Gehalt der Produktfreiheiten im europäi-
schen Binnenmarkt: favour offerentis“ (1995) 59 RabelsZ 1, 16-17; Wolfgang Drasch, 
Das Herkunftslandprinzip im Internationalen Privatrecht (1997), 344-49. 
44  Michael Hellner, “The Country-of-origin Principles in the E-commerce Directive: A 
Conflict with Conflict of Laws?”, in: Angelika Fuchs, Horatia Muir Watt, Étienne 
Pataut (eds.), Les conflits de lois et le système juridique communautaire (2004) 205, 
217-224, who suggests a similarity between the country-of-origin principle and the 
medieval system of personal laws. 
45  See the debate in Friedrich Carl von Savigny, A treatise on the conflict of laws, and 
the limits of their operation in respect of place and time 147 (William Guthrie transl, 
Edinburgh 1869), §§ 350-359.  
46 But see Marc Fallon, « Le principe de proximité dans le droit de l’Union européenne », 
in Le droit international privé: esprit et methodes. Mélanges en l’honneur de Paul La-
garde (2005) 241, 246 ff. 
47 Supra n. 21 and accompanying text. 
48 E.g. de Baere, supra n. 22, 297 and passim. 
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to private international law, and only subsequently controls the application of 
the law so determined. The law of the country-of-origin is relevant, but not as 
applicable law. Some argue that EU law requires the country of destination to 
create a domestic rule that copies the result of the foreign rule.49 Others deni-
grate the law of the country-of-origin: “The fact that the trans-border economic 
activity conforms to the country-of-origin’s law is a factual element which has 
to be taken into account in the application of the host country’s law. The appli-
cation of the principle of origin or the principle of mutual recognition does not 
change the normal functioning of the conflict rules.“50 The purity of private 
international law is saved, but through something of a trick: The undeniable 
influence that the principle has on the application of private international law is 
merely shifted from a question of applicable law to a question of relevant facts. 
3. EU Law as Side-Constraint  
Others find middle solutions. According to a third view, developed in particu-
lar with regard to primary EU law, the country-of-origin principles lacks the 
specificity of a private-international-law norm, but poses constraints on choice 
of law.51 The country-of-origin principle provides an outer framework that al-
lows for several different private-international-law rules.52 EU law does not 
require Member States to adopt a specific private-international-law rule using 
the country of origin as connecting factor. If they use other connecting factors, 
however, the resulting private-international-law norms are restricted in their 
applicability by EU law. 
                                                 
49  Holger Altmeppen, „Schutz vor „europäischen“ Kapitalgesellschaften“ (2004) Neue 
Juristische Wochenschrift 97, 100. 
50  de Baere, supra n. 22, 301 (internal footnote omitted); Michael Wilderspin & Xavier 
Lewis « Les relations entre le droit communautaire et les règles de conflits de lois des 
Etats membres » (2002) 91 Rev crit 1, 21. 
51  Erich Schanze & Andreas Jüttner, „Die Entscheidung für Pluralität: Kollisionsrecht 
und Gesellschaftsrecht nach der EuGH-Entscheidung ‘Inspire Art’” 2003 Die Aktien-
gesellschaft (AG) 661, 665-6; Christiane Wendehorst, „Kollisionsnormen im primären 
Europarecht?“, in: Stefan Lorenz et al. (eds.), Festschrift für Andreas Heldrich zum 
70. Geburtstag (Munich, Beck 2005) 1071; see also Basedow, supra n. 29, 40-44. 
52  E.g. Kurt Lipstein, “The Law relating to the movement of companies in the European 
Community”, in: Festschrift für Erik Jayme I, 527, 529. See also Ansgar Ohly, “Her-
kunftslandprinzip und Kollisionsrecht“ 2001 Gewerblicher Rechtsschutz und Urhe-
berrecht – Internationaler Teil (GRUR Int.) 899, 901-2 (arguing for a “kollisions-
rechtlicher Mindestgehalt”, a minimal core of private international law). 
  17
4. EU Law as Internationally Mandatory Law 
According to a fourth view, we should not focus so much at all on whether the 
country-of-origin principle is a private-international-law rule. Rather, we 
should focus on the coordinated field of harmonized law and conceptualize this 
field as a group of internationally mandatory norms. Since internationally 
mandatory norms apply irrespective of private-international-law norms (at 
least according to one view), these norms would be applicable not through the 
designation of a rule of private international law, but rather because of their 
self-determined territorial scope of application.53 Although the proponent of 
thus point of view, seems to have doubts, admitting it to be “stretching the line 
of argument beyond what existing case law would support”54 and calling it 
“pharisaic”,55 it has found at least one follower.56 
5. EU Law as Functional Equivalent of Private International Law 
The fifth and final suggestion is to think of the country-of-origin principle as 
the functional equivalent of private international law.57 This view makes use of 
the fact that functional equivalence combines sameness and difference – func-
tionally equivalent institutions fulfil the same tasks by different means.58 In-
deed, the country-of-origin principle fulfils the same function like private in-
ternational law, namely the resolution of problems arising from discrepancies 
between legal systems, in particular, discrepancies between the laws of the 
country of destination and the country-of-origin. It does so, however, with dif-
ferently. The clash between traditional private international law and the coun-
try-of-origin principle could thus be described as the choice between function-
ally equivalent tools – though functional equivalence could neither determine 
                                                 
53  Michael Hellner, supra n. 44. 
54  Ibid at 222. 
55  Ibid at 223. 
56 Nina Höning, “The European Directive on e-Commerce (2000/31/EC) and its Conse-
quences on the Conflict of Laws” (2005) Global Jurist Topics Vol. 2, Issue 2, Article 
2, http://www.bepress.com/gj/topics/vol5/iss2/art2/, 27-28, 34-36. 
57  Peter Bernard, „Cassis de Dijon und Kollisionsrecht – am Beispiel des unlauteren 
Wettbewerbs“, (1992) 3 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 437 (for a brief 
exposition in English, see de Baere, supra n. 22, 291-2); Marc Fallon & Johan 
Meusen, „Private International Law in the European Union and the Exception of Mu-
tual Recognition“ (2002) 4 Yearbook of Private International Law 37, 40, 52. 
58 Ralf Michaels, “The Functional Method of Comparative Law”, in: Reinhard 
Zimmermann & Mathias Reimann (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law 
(forthcoming), part III.3. 
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which of them is more appropriate than the other59 nor lay out the practical re-
lationship between the two. 
C. The Need for a Broader Concept of Private International 
Law 
These views do not predict or prescribe certain outcomes. Conceptual theories 
are not right or wrong (and thus cannot be falsified), nor are they necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Rather, they represent different attempts to conceptualize 
certain realities; they are more or less adequate conceptualizations of the rela-
tionship between EU law and private international law. Indeed, all views 
struggle with the same problem. On the one hand, the country-of-origin princi-
ple deals with the same problems as private international law – the conflict be-
tween norms from different legal systems – and it has an undeniable impact on 
the process of traditional private law. In this sense, it is clearly part of private 
international law understood broadly. On the other hand, the country-of-origin 
principle has a structure different from that of traditional private-international-
law norms. In this sense, it can certainly not itself be called a private-
international-law norm. 
The way to resolve this tension is to broaden the concept of private interna-
tional law. Scholars who see a difference between the country-of-origin princi-
ple and private international law all have a particular view of private interna-
tional law in the traditional European sense – a system of rules designating the 
applicable law. This view is unduly narrow, it substitutes one approach for a 
whole discipline. Obviously, the country-of-origin principle is not private in-
ternational law in the sense of the currently predominant approach which de-
termines the applicable law according to the closest connection. But private in-
ternational law as a discipline is broader than its current practice, and the 
field’s history has shown a remarkable set of approaches that have fallen in 
and out of fashion. Indeed, because of this variety of approaches, private inter-
national law as a discipline cannot be defined other than by its function, the 
function to resolve the conflicts that may exist between different private law 
systems. And since the country-of-origin principle fulfils this very same func-
tion, the country-of-origin principle is undeniably itself a part of species of 
private international law, understood functionally. 
Once we broaden our understanding of private international law, we can see 
the different attempts to conceptualize the relationship between the country-of-
                                                 
59 Ibid, part III.5. 
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origin principle and private international law discussed before in a new light. 
In fact, all have their predecessors in the field’s doctrinal history. The country-
of-origin principle acts only on the level of substantive law and requires the 
judge to incorporate rules of the foreign law into his own law or adapt his own 
law to the content of foreign law?60 This is congruent with Roberto Ago’s the-
ory of naturalization of foreign legal rules,61 as well as with Walter Wheeler 
Cook’s local law theory.62 Such approaches have been considered unhelpful 
for reasons that are still valid today. It would be artificial to distinguish such an 
approach in principle from private international law,63 and the approach is not 
helpful in practice, as it gives no guidelines for how the foreign rules should be 
reconstructed.64 Foreign law enters the analysis only as a fact?65 This is not 
different from what Cook argued and what Ehrenzweig later developed into an 
entire private-international-law theory, the so-called datum theory, in which 
foreign law enters the analysis as datum, as fact.66 Again, criticism against this 
approach is valid today. The distinction between fact and law is artificial and 
not helpful; every legal norm is both fact and law.67 
The country-of-origin principle is only a side-restraint on private-inter-
national-law rules rather than a proper norm of private international law?68 
This is congruent with the idea of constitutional limitations on private interna-
tional law as acknowledged, for example, by the German Constitutional Court 
in 197169 or by the US Supreme Court.70 Indeed, the development of US Con-
                                                 
60 Supra, part I.B.2. 
61 Roberto Ago, « Règles des conflits de lois » (1936-IV) Rec des Cours 243, 302-08. 
62  Walter Wheeler Cook, “The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflict of Laws”, (1924) 23 
Yale Law Journal 457, 469: “The forum, when confronted by a case involving foreign 
elements, always applies its own law to the case, but in doing so adopts and enforces 
as its own law a rule of decision identical, or at least highly similar though not identi-
cal, in scope with a rule of decision found in the system of law in force in another 
state or country with which some or all of the foreign elements are connected…”; 
Guinness v. Miller, 291 Fed. 769, 770 (SD NY): “A foreign sovereign under civilized 
law imposes an obligation of its own as nearly homologous as possible to that arising 
in the place where the tort occurs.” (per J. Holmes). 
63 Wendehorst, supra n. 51, 1084. 
64 Hessel Yntema, “The Historical Bases of Conflict of Laws” (1953) 2 Am J Comp L 
297, 316 (“a theory which contains neither truth nor virtue”). 
65 Supra, part I.B.2. 
66 See Eugene F. Scoles et al., Conflict of Laws (4th ed. 2004) 38-43. 
67 Nils Jansen & Ralf Michaels, „Die Auslegung und Fortbildung ausländischen Rechts“, 
(2003) 116 Zeitschrift für Zivilprozeß 3, 8-16 and passim. 
68 Supra, part I.B.3. 
69  Bundesverfassungsgericht (May 4, 1971), 31 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungs-
gerichts (BverfGE) 58; for a discussion in English see Friedrich K. Juenger, “The Ger-
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stitutional law in the area of private international law shows that this conceptu-
alization alone does not determine the importance of the principle vis-à-vis 
traditional choice of law.71 Whereas the US Constitution today has virtually no 
influence on private international law,72 there were times when it could be ex-
pected to determine virtually the entire field.73 The argument that the country-
of-origin principle is not sufficiently specific to qualify as a private interna-
tional law74 norm is not more decisive. Open-ended concepts of modern pri-
vate international law like “governmental interests”, “party expectations”, and 
the like are hardly more specific. 
And the last view to be discussed can be treated the same way. The coun-
try-of-origin principle is not a norm of private international law because the 
coordinated field functions as a set of internationally mandatory norms that are 
outside the ordinary scope of private international law?75 This presumes a nar-
row understanding of private international law. Not only can so-called interna-
tionally mandatory norms be accommodated within private international law, 
as especially Klaus Schurig has shown.76 Even more importantly, they are part 
of existing private international law litigation, as the example of Article 7 of 
the Rome Contracts Convention shows.77 
                                                                                                                                                      
man Constitutional Court and the Conflict of Laws”, (1972) 20 Am J Comp L 290; for a 
French translation see (1974) Rev.crit. 57 with the article by Catherine Labrusse, “Droit 
constitutionnel et droit international privé en Allemagne fédérale”, ibid. at 1-46. 
70 For debate, see infra part II.4. 
71 For an impressive attempt to translate the US debate to the Common Market see Hol-
ger Spamann, “Choice of Law in a Federal System and an Integrated Market”, Har-
vard Jean Monnet Working Paper 8/01, http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/ 
papers/01/012601.html. 
72  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); SunOil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 
717 (1988). 
73 For debate, see infra part II.4. 
74 Supra I.B.3. 
75 Supra I.B.4. 
76  Klaus Schurig, Lois d'application immédiate und Sonderanknüpfung zwingenden 
Rechts: Erkenntnisfortschritt oder Mystifikation?, in: Holl/Klinke (eds.), Inter-
nationales Privatrecht, internationales Wirtschaftsrecht, 55-76 (1985). 
77 Hellner, who advocates the analogy to mandatory norms, sees the basis for applicabil-
ity of such internationally mandatory norms not in their own determination, but rather 
in Arts. 7(2) and 7(1) of the Rome I Convention. Even if the intended Rome I Regula-
tion does not contain a rule on the applicability of foreign mandatory norms, Hellner 
argues “that a general obligation to apply foreign mandatory rules already exists at le-
ast to the extent that these rules are made mandatory by EU law for the purpose of fa-
cilitating one of the fundamental freedoms, viz. the freedom to provide services.” (su-
pra n. 53, 221 f.). Such a general obligation would be a private international law 
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II. The Country-of-Origin Principle as Vested Rights Theory 
If all existing conceptualizations of the country-of-origin principle already re-
late to private international theories, it appears plausible to argue that we 
should openly do the same and conceptualize the principle as private interna-
tional law. But what kind of private international law? To be adequate, the ap-
proach must share those treats that are characteristic for the country-of-origin 
principle. It should achieve universality – the law it designates must be appli-
cable everywhere. It should leave the traditional process of designating the ap-
plicable law intact and only restrict the scope of the otherwise applicable law, 
not simply designate the applicable law on its own. The approach should not 
be based on the closest connection, since even merely formal connections like 
the place of registration suffice for the country-of-origin principle. The ap-
proach should restrict the regulatory power of states and strengthen the rights 
of individuals. Such an approach exists: the theory of vested rights. 
A. Theories of Vested rights  
When we think of vested rights today, we usually think of Dicey in England 
and Beale in the United States, and we think of their vested rights theory as 
thoroughly refuted. But this is a limited picture in two regards. First, just as 
there is not one country-of-origin principle but many, there is not one vested 
rights theory but many.78 Second, the reasons for the decline of different vari-
ants of the theory are sufficiently complex to deserve a closer analysis. 
1. Dicey and Beale: The Separation of Law and Rights 
The first to formulate a full-fledged theory of vested rights was A.V. Dicey, the 
master of both English constitutional law and English private international 
law.79 Dicey held that “the Courts, e.g. of England, never in strictness enforce 
                                                                                                                                                      
norm; an independent category of internationally mandatory norms would not be ne-
cessary.  
78 Max Gutzwiller, Book Review (1936) 10 RabelsZ 1056, 1064-65 
79  A V Dicey, “On Private International Law as a Branch of the Law of England”, 
(1890) 6 Law Quarterly Review 1-21 and 113-127. This article found its way, almost 
unchanged, as introduction into A.V. Dicey, A Digest of the Law of England with Re-
ference to the Conflict of Laws (1896). For the history of the idea in England see Kurt 
H. Nadelmann, “Some Historical Notes on the Doctrinal Sources of American 
Conflict of Laws”, in: id., Conflict of Laws: International and Interstate, 1, 14-20 (o-
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foreign law; when they are said to do so, they enforce not foreign laws, but 
rights acquired under foreign laws.”80 Sovereignty precludes courts from apply-
ing foreign law; justified individual interests require them to recognize foreign 
rights. This separation between the applicable law of the forum and reference to 
the country of origin can already be found in a court opinion from 1775: “Every 
action here must be tried by the law of England, but the law of England says that 
in a variety of circumstances … the law of the country where the cause of action 
arose shall govern”.81 Thus, Dicey promulgates the following General Principle 
No. I. – Every right which has been acquired under the law of any civilized 
country is recognized and (in general) enforced by English courts.82 
This general principle is then subject to four exceptions, two of which are 
relevant here.83 First is the somewhat dubious requirement that rights be 
“duly” acquired.84 Then there is the important Exception II. – English Courts 
will not enforce a right otherwise duly acquired under the law of a foreign 
country, where the enforcement of such right 
(1) is inconsistent with the moral rules upheld by English law; 
(2) involves the recognition, as regards transactions taking place in Eng-
land, of any penal status arising under foreign law, or of any institution 
or status unknown to the law of England; 
(3) is inconsistent with the policy of English law, or with the maintenance 
of English political institutions.85 
Dicey’s approach therefore has three relevant elements. First, the applicable 
law in English courts is always English law. Second, within English law, 
                                                                                                                                                      
riginally in Ius et Lex. Festgabe zum70. Geburtstag von Max Gutzwiller (1959) 263, 
276-81). Nadelmann (ibid 17) points out that Dicey himself mentioned the principle 
earlier in a book review in (1885) 1 Law Quarterly Review 246, 248. He borrowed the 
idea from his colleague and friend Thomas Erskine Holland, Elements of Jurispruden-
ce (1880) 288 n 1; for a glowing review of Holland’s book, see already A V Dicey, 
“The Study of Jurisprudence” (1880) 5 Law Magazine and Review; A Quarterly Re-
view of Jurisprudence and Quarterly Digest of All Reported Cases 5th Series 382. 
80  Dicey, supra n. 79, 10: Similarly In re Askew, [1930] 2 Ch. 259, 267-68; G.C. Chesh-
ire, Private International Law (1935) 6. 
81  Holman v Johnson, 1 Cowp 341, 98 ER 1120, [1775-1802] All ER Rep 98 (1775) per 
Lord Mansfield. 
82  Dicey, supra n. 79, 113. 
83  The other two concern the supremacy of acts of the English parliament, and the inter-
ference with the authority of a foreign sovereign within the country whereof he is sov-
ereign. See ibid 123-24. 
84  Ibid at 118. 
85  Ibid at 120-121. 
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courts will enforce rights acquired under foreign law, provided these rights 
were duly acquired. Notably, this principle extends to the enforcement of for-
eign judgments).86 Third, enforcement of such rights will be refused even 
though they have been duly acquired if such enforcement would be immoral, 
would enforce foreign penal or tax laws, or would violate British public policy. 
Since this theory seemed at the same time to present a welcome more ra-
tional alternative to the traditional idea of comity as the ground for private in-
ternational law,87 Joseph Beale adopted it enthusiastically into the United 
States.88 Prima facie, Beale’s own formulation of the doctrine sounds quite 
similar to that of Dicey: “A right having been created by the appropriate law, 
the recognition of its existence should follow everywhere.”89 Beale, however, 
added a stronger emphasis on territoriality in the application of the vested 
rights theory. For Dicey, his theory had been a structure rather than a generator 
of rules: courts enforced rights acquired under foreign law, but which law cre-
ated those rights was not part of the theory. For Beale, on the other hand, 
vested rights and territoriality went hand in hand: rights could be acquired only 
under the law of the sovereign on whose territory the relevant act took place, 
and other sovereigns had to enforce the rights created by that sovereign. 
Although Beale is often said to be no more than a successor to Dicey, his 
vested rights theory is therefore significantly different from Dicey’s. First, 
unlike Dicey, Beale thought that the vested rights theory could actually desig-
nate the law granting the rights that were to be enforced. The reason was that, 
for him, unlike for Dicey, territoriality was a necessary element of the the-
ory.90 Second, unlike Dicey, Beale had a solution to the problem of which law 
one should look to when a situation involved contacts with more than one 
state. Under his theory, the relevant legal order was that in which the last act 
necessary for the creation of a right took place. This element leads to a third 
difference to Dicey, which becomes clear already in Beale’s early review of 
Dicey’s treatise:91 Whereas Dicey was interested in determining the “proper” 
                                                 
86  Ibid at 114-5. 
87 See Hessel Yntema, „The Comity Doctrine“, in: Ernst von Caemmerer, Arthur 
Nikisch, Konrad Zweigert (eds.), Festschrift für Hans Dölle I (1962) 65; reprinted 
with an introduction by Kurt Nadelmann in (1966) 65 Michigan Law Review 1; see 
also Alan Watson, The Comity of Errors (1992). Both Dicey and Beale were critical of 
comity; see Dicey, supra n 79, 9-10; Joseph Beale, A Treatise on the Conflict of Laws 
I (1935) § 6, pp 53-55; similarly Cheshire, supra n 80, 6. 
88  Beale wrote a very favourable review of Dicey’s treatise. See Beale, “Dicey’s 
‘Conflict of Laws’” (1896) 10 Harvard Law Review 168. 
89  Joseph H. Beale, 3 Cases on the Conflict of Laws 517 (1901). 
90  Beale, supra n. 87, § 5.2, p. 52. 
91  Supra n. 88, 169-71. 
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law, Beale did not think such a value-driven analysis was either appropriate or 
actually what the courts were doing. The “last-in-time” approach solved the 
question with a formal criterion. Altogether, Beale’s theory was both thicker 
and more dogmatic than that of Beale. 
However, these differences are outweighed by the similarities between both 
approaches. Both authors argued that the conflict of laws does not deal with 
applying foreign law, but rather with enforcing rights acquired under foreign 
law, and both authors saw room for a limited exception for the public policy of 
the forum. 
2. Pillet and Niboyet: Choice of Law and Enforcement of Rights 
This idea of vested rights was not confined to England. Not long after Holland 
had introduced it to English conflict of laws (and a translation of his text had 
appeared in France92), Antoine Pillet and J.-P. Niboyet developed a French 
version of the theory that was distinct in important ways.93 In Pillet’s view, 
private international law deals with three discreet questions: the rights of for-
eigners, the designation of the applicable law, and determination of the effect 
of rights acquired abroad – droits acquis.94 For the second question, designa-
tion of the applicable law, he developed an early version of interest analysis 
that predated similar developments in the US by several decades.95 The third 
                                                 
92  M T E Holland, « De l’application de la loi », 12 Revue de droit international et de 
législation comparée 565 (1880); for his embrace of vested rights see ibid 574 n. 2. 
93 For a comparison between Dicey’s vested rights theory and Pillets theory of droits 
acquis, see Horatia Muir Watt, « Quelques remarques sur la théorie anglo-américaine 
des droits acquis » (1986) Rev crit 425. The first mention of droits acquis as the basis 
of private international law appears to be in Comte de Vareilles-Sommières, La 
synthèse du droit international privé I (1897) 31. For this reason, Beale considered 
him particularly relevant; see Beale, supra n. 87, l. 
94  Antoine Pillet, Traité pratique de droit international privé I (1923) 5 (no. 2). The 
rights of foreigners and nationality law are still sometimes considered part of private 
international law in France. 
95  Pillet, ibid 106: “The way to resolve conflicts is to give preference to the law of the 
state which has the greatest interest that the goal pursued by the law in question be at-
tained …, that its law regulate the litigation. If a sacrifice must be made, it should be 
as small as possible.” For the “comparative impairment” approach in the United Sta-
tes, see William Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, (1963) 16 Stanford 
Law Review 1; for a recent assessment, see Erin A. O’Hara, William H. Allen, “Sec-
ond Generation Law and Economics of Conflict of Laws: Baxter's Comparative Im-
pairment and Beyond” 51 (1999) Stanford Law Review 1011. The similarity between 
Pillet and Baxter is occasionally recognized; see, e.g., William Tetley, “A Canadian 
Looks at American Conflict of Law Theory and Practice, Especially in the Light of 
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question, the enforcement of rights acquired abroad, is not only a separate in-
quiry; in fact, both areas are diametrically opposed:96 The designation of the 
applicable law describes a possible conflict of laws, or at least a doubt about 
which of two or more laws is applicable. By contrast, the enforcement of 
vested rights addresses not a conflict between legal orders as to which can cre-
ate a right, but merely the question as to the effect of a right in a country other 
than that which created it.97 The question is not, in other words, which of two 
legal orders is entitled to create (or not create) rights, but rather whether one 
country has to recognize rights that already exist because they have already 
been created, albeit under the law of another country. Like Dicey, Pillet argued 
that the enforcement of foreign rights is different from the question of applica-
ble law.98 Like Dicey, Pillet restricted the duty to enforce foreign rights to duly 
acquired rights, “droits acquis régulièrement”. And like Dicey, he extended his 
theory to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.99 The impor-
tant difference from Dicey (and Beale) is that Pillet created a full system of 
designating the applicable law in addition to his theory of vested rights. In fact, 
Pillet considered a right duly acquired only under the law applicable according 
to general private international law. 
Pillet’s disciples continued adherence to his theory, but with important modifi-
cations. Thus, Niboyet renamed the approach, less elegantly, “the problem of inter-
national effectiveness of definitely constituted rights,100 to avoid the impression 
that rights could somehow exist prior to the law. Even more importantly, he re-
jected Pillet’s concept of international law as basis for a duty to enforce. For him, 
the theory was much more modest: a sovereign should know the effectiveness of a 
right under foreign law in order to draw, under his own law, the appropriate conse-
quences.101 The duty to enforce foreign rights was no longer a legal duty, but only 
a moral duty.102 Although Niboyet was one of the firmest defenders of the vested 
rights theory, at the same time took away its purely legal character. 
                                                                                                                                                      
the American Legal and Social Systems” (2000) 38 Columbia Journal of Transna-
tional Law 299, 314 n. 47; Joel Trachtman, “Economic Analysis of Prescriptive Juris-
diction” (2001) 42 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 26 n. 91. 
96  J.P. Niboyet, Traité de droit international privé I (1938) 284-85. 
97  Ibid 284-93; on the avoidance of conflict, see Muir Watt, supra n. 93, 430. 
98  Similarly J-P Niboyet, “Territoriality and Universal Recognition of Rules of Conflict 
of Laws” (1952) 65 Harvard Law Review 582, 594-95. 
99  Pillet, supra n. 94, 536-44. 
100  Niboyet, supra n. 96, 287 : « le problème de l’efficacité internationale des droits défi-
nitivement constitués ». Niboyet also translated the First Restatement into French 
Law. 
101  Ibid.  
102  Ibid 294. 
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3. Cocceji and Tittmann: Rights and Sovereigns in Ius Gentium 
If the theory of vested rights may appear to have been created around the end of 
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century.103 this impression is wrong. In 
fact, theories of vested rights, of iura quaesita, are much older.104 One example 
can be found in the work of the German Scholar Heinrich Cocceji. Generally, 
Cocceji defended a conception of private international law close to that of Ul-
rich Huber, based on considerations of territoriality and sovereignty.105 How-
ever, embedded within this theory is a formulation of a theory of vested rights: 
For just as it follows from both divine law and the law of peoples that every-
one must obey [the sovereign] to whom he is a subject, and must observe his 
laws in his acts; so it follows from that same law of peoples that a right acquired 
from that observation is valid everywhere, and can be taken away by no one.106 
The formulation closely mirrors the third of Ulrich Huber’s famous three 
axioms.107 Yet, while Huber, speaking of “iura”, probably refers to laws,108 
                                                 
103  Thus indeed Horst Müller, Der Grundsatz des wohlerworbenen Rechts im internatio-
nalen Privatrecht. Geschichte und Kritik (1935) 176 and passim; for criticism, see 
Gutzwiller, supra n. 78. 
104 The first author using the concept was Baldus, according to EM Meijers, „L’histoire 
des principes fondamentaux du droit international privé“ (1934-III) 49 Rec des Cours 
543, 607 (1934) ; see also Gutzwiller, supra n. 78, 1058. 
105  Ulricus Huber, De Conflictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis (Praelectiones 
iuris Romani et hodierni, Vol. II, Book 1, Title iii, 1689). On Huber see now Nikitas 
Hatzimihail, Pre-Classical Conflict of Laws (SJD. Thesis Harvard, 2002), chapter 5; 
on his importance for Dicey, see Llewellyn Davies, “The Influence of Huber’s De 
Conflictu Legum on English Private International Law” (1937) 18 British Yearbook of 
International Law 49, 59. 
106  Heinrich Freiherr v. Cocceji, Exercitationum curiosarum, Palatinarum, Trajectinarum 
et Viadrinarum, volumen primum, Disp 54 Tit 7 no 5, in: Christian von Bar & Peter 
Dopffel (eds.), Deutsches Internationales Privatrecht im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert 
(2001) 528: “Ut enim Divini ac Gentium Juris est ut quisque pareat ei, cui subjectus 
est, ejusque leges in suis actibus observet, ita ejusdem Gentium juri est, ut jus ex illa 
observatione natum ubique valeat, et a nullo aufferri possit. Igitur extra territorium jus 
dici non potest; at contra in territorio rite actum ubique valet, ita ut Jure Naturae ne-
mo, ac ne Princeps quidem jus quaesitum inde aufferre queat.“ (my translation). 
107 Huber’s original text is: “Rectores imperiorum id comiter agunt, ut jura cuiusquue 
populi intra terminus ejus exercita, teneant ubique suam vim, quatenus nihil potestati 
aut juri alterius imperantis ejusque civium praejudicetur. (“Those who exercise sover-
eign authority so act from comity that the laws (iura) of each nation having been ap-
plied within each own boundaries should retain their effect everywhere so far as they 
do not prejudice the power or rights of another government or its subjects.”; translati-
on after Ernest Lorenzen, “Huber’s De Conflictu Legum” 13 Illinois Law Review 401, 
reprinted in id., Selected Articles on the conflict of laws 162 (1947). The first English 
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Cocceji clearly speaks about individual rights.109 The core of Cocceji’s ap-
proach is the same as that for Dicey and Pillet: rights granted by the law of one 
country are valid and enforceable in every other country. Again, the question is 
not one of what law applies, but rather one of the enforcement of rights. Cocceji, 
however, brings a new justification for his theory. The first step in this justifica-
tion is vertical reciprocity between the individual and the ruler: Because indi-
viduals must shoulder the burdens of their rulers’ laws, they should also enjoy 
the benefits from these laws. What looks like a purely domestic argument de-
scribing the reciprocal relationship between one sovereign and its subjects be-
comes an argument for private international law by means of a second step: the 
quid pro quo exists not only between the individual and his own ruler but be-
tween the individual and all sovereigns. In other words, there is a link between 
the facts that an individual is regulated by his ruler, and that another sovereign 
cannot subject the individual to additional regulation if this implies taking away 
rights granted by his ruler. And why should a foreign sovereign be bound to re-
spect a right he has not granted? For Cocceji, this obligation follows from ius 
gentium, understood not as the law between nations but as the law common to 
all nations.110 The acquired right is binding on all sovereigns not because the 
sovereign who granted it had power over other sovereigns in any way, but be-
cause ius gentium requires the general protection of rights. 
Cocceji may not yet have formulated a full theory of vested rights.111 Such 
a theory appeared later in a dissertation by Friedrich Wilhelm Tittmann.112 
Tittmann’s argument, in essence, is as follows: States must recognize acquired 
rights, including rights acquired under foreign laws. This does not create sov-
ereignty concerns because rights are facts, so sovereignty concerns are irrele-
vant. Only as a consequence of this duty to enforce rights acquired under for-
eign law is there a duty to apply these foreign laws. Indeed, the basis for en-
forcement is respect not for the foreign legal order, but rather for the individual 
                                                                                                                                                      
translation of Huber’s text is in Emory v. Grenough, 3 U.S. 369, 370 (1797); for an-
other translation, see Davies, supra n. 105, 64-78. 
108  Müller, supra n. 103, 125-128; contra Davies, supra n. 105, 59; Meijers, supra n. 104, 
670; R. D. Kollewijn, Geschiedenis van de nderlandse wetenschap van het interna-
tional privaatrecht tot 1880, 145 f (1937). 
109  Peter Dopffel, „Einführung“, in: von Bar & Dopffel, supra n. 106, 1, 4. 
110 Ius gentium is a global common law rather than a law between nation states. See, most 
recently, Jeremy Waldron, “Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium” (2005) 119 
Harvard Law Review 129, 132 ff. 
111 Müller, supra n. 103, 149-51. 
112 Friedrich Wilhelm Tittmann, De competentia legum externarum et domesticarum in 
defiendis potissimum iuribus coniugum (Halle 1822); for analysis see Müller, supra n. 
103, 180-7. 
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that has acquired this right. Although Tittmann’s book was not influential, the 
ideas he formulated must have been in tune with scholarly thinking of his time. 
The idea that to deny a person the enforcement of rights she has acquired under 
foreign law would be a violation of her personality rights reappears in the work 
of other authors proposing theories of vested rights, including Georg Puchta 
and Ferdinand Lassalle.113 
4. US Constitution: Full Faith and Credit and Due Process 
Such considerations – that of an obligation to recognize private rights and that 
of a superior law like ius gentium as basis for this obligation – are mirrored 
centuries later in case law of the US Supreme Court on the limits set by the US 
Constitution on private international law. Of particular relevance is the due 
process clause, which mandates, in essence, that certain rights (vested rights) 
may not be taken away without due process of law.114 For some time, the 
Court seemed all but willing to constitutionalize the vested rights theory based 
on the due process clause. For example, the Court held in 1930 that a Texas 
state court was barred from applying Texas law to a contract entered into in 
Mexico because Texas could not affect “the rights of parties beyond its borders 
having no relation to anything done or to be done within them.”115 Clearly this 
was about the protection of rights rather than about the duty to apply foreign 
law. This duty to apply foreign law was inferred from another provision of the 
Constitution, the full faith and credit clause.116 In the 1930s, therefore, consti-
tutional constraints on private international law in the US consisted of two 
separate strands – one regarding the enforcement of rights acquired abroad, the 
other regarding the application of foreign law. 
Later developments severely weakened both the clarity and the scope of 
these constitutional bases for a conflict of laws principle in the US. First, the 
                                                 
113 Georg Friedrich Puchta, Pandekten (11th ed., Leipzig 1872) § 113, p. 173: „ ... daß ein 
Staat, indem er den Fremden als Rechtssubjekt anerkennt, ihm auch die schon erwor-
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115 Home Insurance v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930). 
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306 U.S. 493 (1939). 
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due process clause cases were reinterpreted. Their ratio decidendi was no 
longer seen to be in the enforcement of rights, but rather in a required connec-
tion between the facts and the law applied.117 Since such a connection was also 
the relevant element for the full faith and credit clause, both approaches were 
combined into one, requiring, eclectically, “a significant contact or significant 
aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of [that fo-
rum’s] law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”118 Second, the Court 
severely reduced the threshold for such contacts, all but abandoning any con-
stitutional limitation on choice of law.119 This reinterpretation of the due proc-
ess clause thus led to the demise of a constitutional vested rights theory.120 
B. Similarities With the Country-of-Origin Principle 
Vested rights theories may thus are varied, but they all share certain core ele-
ments. Importantly, these core elements can all be shown to exist in the coun-
try-of-origin principle as well. 
1. Terminology 
The first parallel between these theories of vested rights and the country-of-
origin principle is linguistic. Notably, the first occurrence of a country-of-
origin principle takes place in an important English decision on private interna-
tional law: “Being entertained in an English Court, [the question] must be ad-
judicated according to the principles of English law, applicable to such a case. 
But the only principle applicable to such a case by the laws of England is, that 
the validity of Miss Gordon’s marriage rights must be tried by reference to the 
law of the country, where, if they exist at all, they had their origin.”121 Even if 
great weight should not be assigned to this linguistic parallel between private 
international law and the country-of-origin principle, it suggests at least that 
the thought patterns underlying jurisprudence about vested rights and the coun-
try-of-origin principle are not altogether dissimilar. The idea that the rights 
                                                 
117 Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Limited, 348 U.S. 66 (1954); Clay v. 
Sun Ins. Office, Limited, 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
118 Allstate Insurance Co v Hague 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981); see also Phillips Petroleum 
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119 Ibid. 
120 For a recent attempt to “resuscitate a few key concepts that Beale got right” see 
Kermit Roosevelt, “The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts” (1999) 97 
Michigan Law Review 2448, quote at 2458 n. 48. 
121  Dalrymple v. Dalrymple (1811) 2 Hagg Const 54, 58, 59, emphasis added. 
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have an origin distinct from their enforcement in the courts is a centrepiece of 
both the vested rights theory and the country of origin principle. 
2. Universality 
Another similarity between the country-of-origin principle and vested rights is 
relevant – universality. Under the vested rights theory, a right acquired (and 
valid) under one law must be considered valid in all other countries.122 This 
parallels the policy behind the country-of-origin principle to subject a provider 
to only one set of norms, regardless of where he becomes active. Of course, 
many approaches to private international law aim at such universality, includ-
ing the traditional Savignyan approach that underlies the European regulations. 
However, not every conflict of laws theory aims at universality in this sense. 
Currie’s interest analysis with its strong preference for the application of forum 
law, for example, is not such a theory.  
3. Separation from Applicable Law 
In another regard, the country-of-origin principle is more similar to the vested 
rights theory than to a Savignyan system. The country-of-origin principle does 
not determine an applicable law. It operates separately from the designation of 
the applicable law, intervening only once the applicable law has been deter-
mined through a traditional choice-of-law analysis. is hard to conceptualize 
within Savignyan private international law; it has led many to conclude that 
EU law is different from choice of law altogether.123 
Yet, exactly the same separation is apparent in the vested rights theory. 
Frequently, foreign rights are deemed facts, not law, so they do not interfere 
with the determination of the applicable law.124 Pillet designed his system of 
acquired rights alongside and even in opposition to a general system of conflict 
of laws. Even Dicey’s claim that English courts will always apply English law 
is, in fact, the result of a (very simple) conflicts rule that designates the law of 
the forum as the generally applicable law. The vested rights theory then, for 
Dicey, operates outside this general rule, as it does for Pillet. Similarly, for 
Cocceji, the concept that one sovereign has to respect the rights granted by an-
other sovereign is only one part of his approach to private international law; 
                                                 
122 This is the main element of “vestedness” as used by Perry Dane, “Vested Rights, 
“Vestedness” and Choice of Law” (1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1191. 
123 Supra I.B.1. 
124 Tittmann, supra n. 112, 7. 
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the other part covers the relationship between sovereigns.125 At least for some 
authors, then, the vested rights theory leaves intact a system that designates the 
applicable laws. This makes the vested rights theory a better candidate for a 
reconceptualization of the country-of-origin principle than Savignyan private 
international law. 
4. Regulations, Rights and Privileges 
One apparent difference lies in the fact that the country-of-origin principle fo-
cuses not on rights but rather on freedom from restrictions. Is the country-of-
origin principle really about rights? Does it not, rather, encompass a multitude of 
possible legal positions, many of which are in fact better characterized as privi-
leges and liberties than as rights – the privilege to provide services, for example? 
In fact, the apparent difference highlight a similarity. On the one hand, early 
predecessor theories of the country-of-origin principle also focused, not surpris-
ingly, on privileges rather than rights. Cities often granted merchant privileges 
to foreign merchants; Since these privileges grew into acquired rights, they 
could not be withdrawn126 On the other hand, the 19th century notion of rights 
that underlies Holland’s work on jurisprudence and thereby also, if indirectly, 
Dicey’s and Beale’s work on private international law, is broader than the cur-
rent notion would be. All law was thought to consist of rights; privileges and 
liberties (in Hohfeldian terminology) were thereby included. 
At the same time, this distinction between rights and privileges suggests a 
weakness, and indeed the history of the vested rights theory illustrates the lim-
its of a country-of-origin principle. The theory worked well regarding clearly 
defined privileges that were explicitly granted by a sovereign. It still works 
well in the area of enforcement of foreign judgments, which both Dicey and 
Pillet included in their theories of vested rights. It works far less well, how-
ever, as a general theory of private international law because of the question 
when and what rights are actually granted in the first place. Similar problems 
arise with the country-of-origin principle in the realm of private law. The prin-
ciple is created predominantly with administrative (sovereign) processes in 
mind that can easily be compared to the granting of privileges in city states. 
The principle works far less well, at least for the solution of specific problems, 
in the area of private international law, where no formal “granting” process can 
                                                 
125 Hans Jürgen Hilling, Das kollisionsrechtliche Werk Heinrich Freiherr v. Cocejis 
(1644-1719) (2002) 16. 
126 Johann Marquard, Tractatus de iure mercatorum (Frankfurt 1662), lib 1 cap. 6 de 
confirmatione privilegiorum mercantilium; cited after Gutzwiller, supra n. 78, 1060. 
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be observed, and thus both existence and scope of liberties are unclear. 
5. „Günstigkeitsprinzip“ 
One problem of conceptualizing the country-of-origin principle as a traditional 
private-international-law rule is that the country of destination is not obliged to 
apply the laws of the country-of-origin, but only prohibited from posing addi-
tional barriers. If an activity is illegal under the law of the country of origin, 
the country of destination is free to validate the activity under its own, more 
liberal law. This is what led Basedow to conceptualize the country-of-origin 
principle as a Günstigkeitsprinzip, the application of the more favourable of the 
two laws.127 The vested rights theory provides a more elegant conceptualiza-
tion.128 This is not true for its stronger version, which submits both the crea-
tion and the denial of rights to a certain legal order. For Beale, the country in 
whose territory the last act took place had the exclusive power to determine 
whether a right had been acquired. The US Supreme Court has held simi-
larly.129 Even Cocceji seems to argue this in his example of a testator who 
writes a will in the form prescribed by the law of his domicile, but not admis-
sible under the law of the place where he writes the will.130 This will is invalid 
not only under the lex loci but also under the lex domicilii, because the domi-
cile cannot create rights outside its boundaries. But insofar as these theories 
deal also with the non-creation of rights, they lose their character of “pure” 
vested rights theories. This part must be explained by other factors, most im-
portantly territoriality. 
A vested rights theory confined to the enforcement of rights is in perfect 
congruence with a country-of-origin principle. Both ensure that positions ac-
quired under one law cannot be taken away by another law. Both are silent re-
garding the opposite question whether restrictions imposed by one law must be 
enforced by another law. A Günstigkeitsprinzip is compatible with a vested 
rights theory that is confined to the creation of rights or privileges. Although 
states are required to recognize the rights already vested in a person, they are 
not prevented from assigning additional rights to that person. 
                                                 
127 Supra I.B.1. 
128 Antoine Pillet, "La théorie générale des droits acquis" (1925-III) Rec des Cours 485, 
533: "la solution las plus libérale des deux". 
129 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934) (a 
Tennessee claim time-barred under Tennessee law cannot be enforced under Missis-
sippi law). The case was virtually overruled by Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, supra n , 
308 n 11. 
130  Cocceji, supra n. 106; cf. Hilling, supra n. 125, 51-54. 
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6. Mandatory Requirements of Public Interest and Public Policy  
Exception 
The vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle match perfectly 
regarding another aspect, the public policy exceptions. The Court of provided 
such an exception already in its Cassis de Dijon decision, excepting “manda-
tory requirements of public interest” from a country-of-origin principle.131 
Since then, the Court has developed an elaborate system of exceptions to the 
principle of mutual recognition. Similarly, the country-of-origin principle, as 
stated in directives, allows for exceptions for public policy not only outside the 
coordinated field, but even within it. This accords with the public policy ex-
ceptions formulated by proponents of vested rights theories. Dicey saw an ex-
ception for foreign rights inconsistent with the moral rules or the policy upheld 
by English law;132 Beale’s theory provided for a (limited) public policy excep-
tion, and Pillet allowed for the non-enforcement of foreign rights that violated 
French public policy. 
Critics consider these public policy exceptions incompatible with a private-
international-law concept of the country-of-origin principle.133 They are in 
good company with critics of the vested rights theory who considered the pub-
lic policy exception an unwarranted denial of the vested rights theory. Both 
groups of critics ignore the particular structure of the theories they criticize. 
Even if the creation of rights is recognized, enforcement of these rights can be 
made subject to requirements of public policy just as the enforcement of do-
mestic rights is. This is perfectly compatible with a public policy exception to 
the country-of-origin principle. 
7. The Common Market and the Circle of Civilized Nations 
A final similarity is illuminating. The country-of-origin principle is confined to 
EU Member States. There is no worldwide country-of-origin principle (al-
though the proposal has been made to some extend the concept from the e-
commerce directive to worldwide application).134 The limitation has three 
connected reasons. First, the common market is a specific goal of the European 
                                                 
131  Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral-AG/Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein, deci-
sion of 20 February 1979, [1979] ECR 649 para 8. 
132  Supra, text accompanying n. 85. 
133  de Baere, supra n. 22, 299-302. 
134  Mark F. Kightlinger, “A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem? The E-Commerce Directive 
as a Model for International Cooperation on Internet Choice of Law” (2003) 24 Mi-
chigan Journal of International Law 719. 
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Communities. There are no similar goals on a global level, at least to the same 
degree. Second, the member states of the EU share a common history and a 
common culture; their legal systems are not likely to be dramatically different 
from the start. Third, the similarity, or at least the equivalence, of different le-
gal systems is actively pursued by the EU. This connection between equiva-
lence and the country-of-origin principle can be seen most clearly in the area 
of the directives. Harmonization takes place within a “coordinated field”, and 
the country-of-origin principle is then confined to these coordinated fields. 
The vested rights theory includes a similar restriction based on similar rea-
soning. Dicey limited his theory to rights acquired under the laws of “civilized 
countries”, with words that could come from a textbook on harmonization and 
mutual recognition in the EU: “the willingness of one State to give effect to 
rights gained under the laws of other States depends upon the existence of a 
similarity in principle between the legal and moral notions prevailing among 
different communities.”135 Similarly, Niboyet invoked the “circle of civilized 
nations”.136 This community of civilized nations is replicated in the member 
states of the European Union. International law (which was likewise limited to 
“civilized nations”) provided a framework for the obligation to enforce foreign 
rights like the EU Treaty does today. 
III. Criticism of Vested Rights Theories and the Country-of-
Origin Principle 
That the country-of-origin principle is similar in significant respects to the 
vested rights theory is not only important for the heuristics of European law; in 
addition, it suggests a serious challenge. The vested rights theory in private in-
ternational law has been thoroughly discarded. Does this make the country-of-
origin principle untenable, too? If the arguments for its refutation applied simi-
larly to the country-of-origin principle, this would be an important and far-
reaching lesson for EU law from private international law. However, it can be 
shown that this is not the case – the country-of-origin principle can refute most 
of the criticism brought against the vested rights theory. This has implications 
for the contingency of arguments in private international law and for the pecu-
liarities of private international law in the European Union.  
                                                 
135  Dicey, supra n. 79, 116. 
136 Niboyet, supra n. 96, no 937, p. 294. 
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A. Criticism of the Country-of-Origin Principle and of Vested 
Rights  
The vested rights theory has had to yield to devastating criticism in every 
country where it was once supported. The first crucial attack occurred as early 
as 1842 in Carl Georg Wächter’s important article on private international 
law,137 long before Dicey, Beale, and Pillet constructed their theories. 
Wächter’s arguments and their subsequent approval by Savigny138 ensured 
that the theory of vested rights never became strong in Germany. In the United 
States, where the vested rights theory had achieved canonic status as the basis 
for the first restatement of conflict of laws, a similarly devastating criticism 
was voiced especially by Walter Wheeler Cook.139 In France, the vested rights 
theory is now all but dead140 due to the forceful criticism by Arminjon.141 In 
England, the theory’s death was more peaceful but no less complete. After 
Dicey’s death, one of the authors to replace him, Kurt Lipstein, changed Gen-
eral Principle I by replacing „duly acquired“ with „acquired ... according to the 
English rules of conflict of laws“.142 This brought Dicey in line with Pillet 
while at the same time opening him to the same criticism voiced by Arminjon 
– namely, that the theory was superfluous.143 Indeed, in 1971 Morris could 
                                                 
137  Carl Georg von Wächter, „Ueber die Collision der Privatrechtsgesetze verschiedener 
Staaten (Fortsetzung), (1842) 25 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 1, 1-9. A partial 
English translation of the relevant section on vested rights can be found in Nadel-
mann, supra n. 79, 16; a different part of this essay has been translated to English, to-
gether with an introductory note, as Kurt H. Nadelmann, “Wächter's Essay on the Col-
lision of Private Laws of different States” (1964) 13 Am J Comp L 414.f. 
138 Savigny, supra n. 45,147. 
139 Cook, supra n. 62; see also David Cavers, “A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem” 
(1933) 47 Harvard Law Review 173, 175-76.  
140  E.g. Pierre Mayer & V Heuzé, Droit international privé (8th ed., 2004) nos 110-112, 
pp 81-82; Bernard Audit, Droit international privé (4th ed. 2006) no 233, p. 192. 
141  Pierre Arminjon, « La notion des droits acquis en droit international privé » (1933-II) 
44 Rec des Cours 1. See also Hermann Weiller, Der Schutz der wohlerworbenen 
Rechte im internationalen Privatrecht (Diss Frankfurt/M. 1934). 
142  Dicey, Conflict of Laws LXV (6th ed. By Morris and others, 1949). Cf. F. A. Mann, 
Book Review (1949) 12 Modern Law Review 518, 520: “he has greatly improved the 
formulation of the vested rights theory”; the change was criticized as insufficient by 
Cavers, Book review, (1950) 63 Harvard Law Review 1278, 1280 (“Clarification here 
is needed”) and Max Rheinstein, Book Review (1950) 25 New York University Law 
Review 180, 182 (“What good beyond the avoidance of too radical a break with the 
tradition of the master’s language can possibly be achieved with the preservation of a 
terminology reminiscent of the vested rights theory?”). 
143 See infra 1. 
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safely proclaim that „the vested rights theory is dead“.144 Conflict of laws as 
conflict of norms had effectively won the day. 
The country-of-origin principle, by contrast, is extant – and vitally so. Its 
deletion from the services directive was owed to the political climant of the 
moment and is unlikely to be permanent. This survival is prima facie surpris-
ing, since the principle has engendered an amount of criticism nearly equaling 
that brought earlier against the vested rights theory. Moreover, nolens volens, 
the criticism that private-international-law scholars voice today against the 
country-of-origin principle mirrors the criticism brought earlier against the 
vested rights theory. 
1. The Need to Determine the Applicable Law 
One criticism of the country-of-origin principle is its unclear relationship with 
private international law. Regardless of Article 1(4) of the e-commerce Direc-
tive, authors state that the vested rights theory “really” is a conflicts rule, re-
gardless of what it sets out to be.145 Although the country-of-origin principle is 
presented as an alternative to a system designating the applicable law, it neces-
sary both to determine the relevant legal order, through the connecting factor 
of “origin”, and to look to its legal provisions in order to determine whether a 
provider complies with the rules. 
Similar criticism has been voiced against the claim of the vested rights the-
ory, challenging the claim that the enforcement of rights avoids the need to ap-
ply foreign law. Both Dicey and Pillet had conceived theories of vested rights as 
an alternative to a system designating the applicable law. Dicey thought he 
could avoid the problem of applying foreign law altogether; Pillet thought he 
could do the same for at least some situations. Critics have pointed out that both 
hopes were illusory, for determining whether a right had been “duly acquired”, 
“régulièrement acquis” requires determining the legal order that allegedly cre-
ated it. For Dicey’s theory this meant that, despite his argument to the contrary, 
the enforcement of foreign rights implied, necessarily, the designation and ap-
                                                 
144  J. H. Morris, The Conflict of Laws (1971) 523. Similarly Nicholas de Belleville 
Katzenbach, “Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in In-
terstate and International Law” (1956) 65 Yale Law Journal 1087, 1087-88 (“the the-
ory of vested rights has been brutally murdered by Cook, Lorenzen and others, though 
it still flits ghostlike through many decisions.”); R. D. Carswell, The Doctrine of 
Vested Rights in Private International Law, (1959) 8 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 268. 
145 Peter Mankowski, „Wider ein Herkunftslandprinzip für Dienstleistungen im Binnen-
markt“ (2004) IPRax 385. 
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plication of foreign law.146 Pillet’s theory, it has been argued, works well only 
when, at the time when the right is created, contacts to only one country ex-
ist.147 At the same time, the theory is unnecessary for such situations because 
their resolution is obvious.148 If, however, contacts to more than one country ex-
ist, one has to decide which of these countries’ laws should govern the creation 
of the right; then the process of enforcing foreign rights is no longer distinct 
from the process of designating the applicable law.149 In short, the vested rights 
theory is nothing more than a misnomer for a theory that, like other theories, 
seeks to determine the law applicable to a transaction. The focus on rights is 
wrong, because rights are a fiction.150 In reality, the enforcement of foreign 
rights necessarily implies the application of foreign law.151 
2. Circularity  
In Centros, the Court of Justice held that a company that has been validly cre-
ated under the rule of one member state must be recognized by other member 
states. Critics have pointed to the circularity of this argument. Whether a com-
pany has been created validly under a certain law cannot be determined before 
that law has been found to be applicable in the first place. It is for the private 
international law norms of other countries, not for the country of origin itself, 
to determine the scope of its laws.  
This circularity argument is well-known from the debate over the vested 
rights theory, pointing to its circularity.152 A U.S. District Court formulated 
this criticism accurately in 1950: „It is of no great help to say that the rights 
cannot be changed because they are ‚vested’, for by ‚vested’ we mean essen-
tially that we will not allow them to be changed.“153 This criticism is more 
than one hundred years older. Frequently, Savigny is credited with its first 
formulation: „This principle leads into a complete circle; for we can only know 
what are vested rights if we know beforehand by what local law we are to de-
                                                 
146 Carswell, supra n. 144, 275. 
147 Mayer & Heuzé, supra n. 140, no. 112. 
148  Arminjon, supra n. 141, 58: “La nature d’une question ne change pas parce que sa so-
lution est évidente.” 
149 Arminjon, supra n. 141, 59 ff. 
150  Lea Brilmayer, Conflict of Laws (2nd ed. 1995) 31, 37-41. 
151  Elliott E Cheatham, “American Theories of Conflict of Laws: Their Role and Utility” 
58 Harvard Law Review 361, 380-1 (1945). 
152 Carswell, supra n. 144, 279. 
153  Horwitt v. Horwitt, 90 F.Supp. 528, 530 (D. Conn. 1950).  
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cide as to their complete acquisition.“154 But the first author to formulate the 
criticism was Wächter: „Anyway to decide the question whether our judge 
must decide, in certain cases, according to foreign laws, on the basis that he 
must protect duly acquired rights, probably rests on a petitio principii. If, in the 
matter of a legal relation established abroad, one wishes to claim for a right 
acquired under foreign law absolute protection also within one’s own country, 
one argues from a premise that has still to be proved, namely, that this legal 
relation is to be judged according to foreign, and not domestic, laws.”155 
Another way to put the argument is that the theory is inconclusive. It is a 
plausible liberal argument against the retroactive application of laws that if 
state A has granted a right, state A cannot take the right away again. In fact, 
this was the political basis for a domestic version of the vested rights approach. 
But it simply does not follow that state B is under a similar obligation with re-
gard to rights granted by state A. Translated into the EU context, England may 
be bound by its liberal rules for the creatin of companies, but it does not follow 
that Denmark is similarly bound by them.  
                                                 
154 Savigny, supra n. 45, 147 (William Guthrie, transl., Edinburgh 1869) “Dieser Grund-
satz führt auf einen bloßen Zirkel. Denn welche Rechte wohlerworben sind, können 
wir nur erfahren, wenn wir zuvor wissen, nach welchem örtlichen Rechte wir den 
vollzogenen Erwerb zu beurteilen haben.” 
155  Wächter, supra n. 137, 4 f (translation partly mine, partly following Nadelmann, su-
pra n. 79, 16). The original German text is: “Überhaupt dürfte es auf einer petitio 
principii beruhen, wenn man die Frage, ob unser Richter nach fremden Gesetzen in 
gewissen Fällen zu sprechen habe, nach dem Grundsatze entscheiden will, daß er 
wohlerworbene Rechte schützen müsse. Will man bei einem im Auslande begründeten 
Rechtsverhältnisse für das nach fremden Gesetzen erworbene Recht unbedingten 
Schutz auch im Inlande in Anspruch nehmen: so argumentiert man aus einer Prämisse, 
die noch gar nicht erwiesen ist, und setzt etwas voraus, was erst zu erweisen ware, 
nämlich, daß jenes Rechtsverhältnis nach fremden und nicht nach einheimischen Ge-
setzen zu beurtheilen sei.” Wächter himself cites for his insight to August Siegmund 
Kori, Erörterungen praktischer Rechtsfragen aus dem gemeinen und Sächsischen Ci-
vilrechte und Civilprocesse III (Dresden, 1929) 3 note (Dresden 1929), who argues as 
follows against Tittmann (supra n. 112): “ob Jemand aus einer im Auslande vorge-
nommenen Handlung ein Recht erworben habe? bestimmt sich allererst darnach: ist 
die Handlung nach ausländischen oder inländischen Gesetzen zu beurtheilen?” 
(“Whether someone has acquired a right due to an act committed abroad, is determi-
ned primarily by whether foreign or domestic law must be applied to the act.”). Kori 
in turn responded to other aspects of Wächter’s essay; see Kori, „Ein Beitrag zu der 
Theorie über Collision der Gesetze verschiedener Staaten, vornehmlich zur Beleuch-
tung der Wächter’schen Ansicht“, (1844) 27 Archiv für die civilistische Praxis 309 
(1844). On Kori’s approach see (briefly) Müller, supra n. 103, 216-7. 
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3. Indeterminacy 
There is another problem with the country-of-origin principle. It is all good an 
well to give the country of origin exclusive regulatory competence, but this 
principle cannot determine which country qualifies as country of origin in the 
first place. This question is easy to answer when administrative actions, like 
registration, take place. It becomes much harder in the area of private law, in 
which mere factual connections matter. 
The vested rights theory had to deal with a similar criticism: it cannot de-
termine which legal order grants rights because laws cannot determine their 
own applicability.156 To be complete, the vested rights theory requires an addi-
tion – namely, a criterion to determine which legal order is competent to grant 
rights. Two responses can be given. The first is Dicey’s. Dicey admitted that 
his theory could not deliver this criterion.157 At the same time, however, he did 
not think that this was a grave shortcoming. Whenever a legal system grants a 
right, he argued, there should be an assumption that this right was “duly” ac-
quired and is therefore enforceable. This suggests a shift to a unilateral 
method.158 The second response is to combine the vested rights concept with a 
criterion that determines the competent legal order. Beale and Pillet both chose 
this second response, albeit in different ways. For Beale, the necessary crite-
rion was territoriality, based on his preference for a territorial understanding of 
the law in general. For Pillet, the necessary criterion followed from the appli-
cation of general rules of private international law. We see that territoriality, 
which critics have often deemed a necessary element of vested rights theo-
ries,159 is but one of various connecting factors compatible with the theory. 
Both responses have weaknesses. The unilateral approach advocated by 
Dicey works well when the creation of rights is based on a formal act that is 
clearly recognizable – for example, the rendering of a judicial decision. Yet, 
whether a legal order creates a right without such a formal act is often hard to 
determine. Coupling the vested rights theory to an additional criterion as Beale 
and Pillet do weakens its explanatory power. Beale’s strong emphasis on terri-
toriality has given way to much criticism because this criterion was considered 
simplistic.160 Pillet’s idea to determine the legal order competent to create 
                                                 
156 E.g. Savigny, supra n 45, 147 (“merely formal”). See, generally, H. L. A. Hart, “Self-
referring Laws”, in: id., Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy (1983) 170-8. 
157  Cf. Arminjon, supra n. 141, 37 ff. 
158 Similarly Roosevelt, supra n. 120. 2467,  
159 E.g. Carswell, supra n. 144, 271. 
160 See already Ernest G. Lorenzen, “Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of 
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rights with regard to the generally applicable law makes his vested rights the-
ory redundant: since that order’s law is applicable anyway, the notion of vested 
rights does not yield any additional analytical purchase.161 However, this criti-
cism only points to the theory’s inconclusiveness without proving it wrong.  
4. Insufficiency 
Another criticism of the country-of-origin principle points to its insufficiency. 
As a general approach, the principle would designate the country-of-origin’s 
law as exclusively applicable. Since this is not the scope of the principle, regu-
latory gaps may occur. In its stricter version, the principle requires the institu-
tions of the country of origin to regulate exclusively. For various reasons, these 
institutions may be disinclined to regulate, so underregulation is not 
unlikely.162 If the principle is non-exclusive, this leaves the question of the 
otherwise applicable law open, if such a restriction is found to exist.163 
Again, this criticism mirrors one voiced earlier against the vested rights 
theory. In fact, we find an early version already in Wächter’s 1842 article: The 
theory of vested rights is insufficient. Even if it can explain why a court must 
refer to foreign law regarding the creation of a right, it cannot explain why a 
court must do the same regarding the non-creation of a right.164 Like with the 
country-of-origin principle, there are two kinds of vested rights theories in this 
respect – one exclusive, the other non-exclusive –, and the criticism applies 
differently to each of them. Those theories that refer to foreign law for the non-
creation of rights as well as for the creation of rights cannot be based only on a 
theory of vested rights; rather, they replace ordinary private-international-law 
methods with some other method – for example, Beale’s territoriality method. 
However, those theories that refer to foreign law only for the creation of rights 
are necessarily incomplete. They require an additional set of norms to deter-
mine the law applicable to issues other than the creation of rights – be it forum 
law, as in Dicey’s theory, or a law determined otherwise, as in Pillet’s theory. 
                                                 
161 E. Bartin, Principles de droit international privé I (1930) § 78, p. 195 ; Gerhard Kegel 
& Klaus Schurig, Internationales Privatrecht (9th ed. 2004) § 1 VI, p 25. 
162 Mankowski, supra n. 145, 388-9. 
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5. Formalism 
The country-of-origin principle, critics hold, emphasizes merely formal con-
necting factors over substantive connections. For example, the Court of Justice 
in Centros obliged Denmark to recognize a company as English although, un-
disputably, all relevant connections pointed to Denmark: the company had 
been set up by two Danes for their Danish business, the only contact to Eng-
land, apart from the registration, was the formal address for the company at a 
friend’s place. Similarly, the country-of-origin principle in the Services Direc-
tive might enable providers to establish a formal home in a member state with 
low regulation, although his economic interest would lie entirely in the country 
of destination. 
Obviously, this mirrors the criticism against the vested rights theory. In a 
classic American casebook opinion,165 an Alabama court applied the law of 
Tennessee to a tort claim following a railway accident, although all connec-
tions except for the place of the accident – plaintiff’s and defendant’s domicile, 
their employment contract, the defendant’s alleged negligence – all led to Ala-
bama. Thus, although Alabama had both the much greater regulatory interest 
and the closer connection, Tennessee law was applied on the purely formal ba-
sis that the plaintiff’s right, if any, had been vested in Tennessee when the last 
event necessary for its creation, the injury, had occurred there. 
6. Policies 
The final argument may be the most important one. This is the policy argu-
ment, directed against the requirement of both the vested rights theory and the 
country-of-origin principle that states must give up part of their sovereignty to 
private rights and private parties. Mankowski makes exactly this argument 
against restrictions of regulatory laws of the country of destination when he ar-
gues, against the country-of-origin principle for competition law: “This is an 
eminently political decision. Every state must take this decision for itself and 
for its own market”.166 Wächter expressly invoked the same argument against 
he vested rights theory: „In any event, the legislator of a foreign state can eas-
ily recognize rights which are completely opposed to the moral and religious 
principles, the notions of law and justice and the requirements of public policy, 
the security of transactions and the care for the citizens’ economic well being, 
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on which our state’s legislation is founded. Shall now our state have to recog-
nize and protect such rights, e.g. slavery, right to usurious interest rates, to 
debts from gaming etc., if and because they were duly acquired in that foreign 
state under its laws?”167 
The criticism based on policy rests on three different considerations. The 
first goes to the relationship between two countries and the allocation of regu-
latory power between them. Should a rule point to the affected legal order or to 
the country of origin? The affected legal order may, of course, be determined 
in different ways. For Mankowski, it is the affected market; for Wächter, it was 
always the forum; for. Nonetheless, all critics agree that the country of origin, 
or the country under whose law a right is created, is frequently not necessarily 
the country with the closest connection or the country that is otherwise the 
most appropriate for regulation. 
The second consideration in the policy-based criticism concerns not the re-
lationship between countries so much as the relationship between the state and 
the individual. Critics of the country-of-origin principle point to a vital state 
interest in protecting the (social) welfare of its own citizens against the indi-
vidual interests of suppliers; the oppose what they see as an undue emphasis on 
market liberalism over the social welfare state. This creates a notable parallel 
to the vested rights theory which was born as a classical liberal theory of pri-
vate international law – it protects rights that have been granted by one state 
against all other states. This is obvious in the due process clause of the US 
Constitution, but similar considerations can be found in other formulations of 
the theory. One of Pillet’s disciples, Bernard, justified the theory of droits ac-
quis not with the mutual respect between sovereigns, but rather with the re-
spect due to private rights.168 The heyday of vested rights theories in the 19th 
century coincides with the heyday of political liberalism.169 Likewise, their 
demise in the 20th century coincides with the rise of the welfare state. 20th cen-
tury critics of the vested rights theory see the judge’s task as finding a good so-
lution for the common good, rather than protecting individual rights and 
thereby overlooking the common good.  
The third policy consideration concerns the relationship between the par-
ties. Both the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin principle favour 
one party over the other on the basis of abstract criteria. This has spurred criti-
                                                 
167  Wächter, supra n. 137, 6 (my translation). 
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cism against both. As regards the country-of-origin principle, critics ask why 
suppliers should be preferred to consumers.170 As regards the vested rights 
theory, Kropholler asks a structurally similar question: Why should the credi-
tor (who invokes his right) should be preferred to the debtor (who can only in-
voke his liberty).171 Indeed, this criticism of both is particularly apt in con-
sumer law (to which currently no country-of-origin principle is applied). Tradi-
tional private international law protects the passive consumer against the active 
supplier – if a consumer is contacted in his home state by an out-of-state sup-
plier, he can rely on the application of his home law. The country-of-origin 
principle, like the vested rights theory, would rather protect the supplier, al-
though – thus the criticism – it should be easier for the supplier, as the moving 
party, than for the consumer to comply with foreign law. 
B. The Country-of-Origin Principle Can Refute the Criticism 
These five bases for criticism were enough to bring the vested rights theory 
down. The theory was rejected because it did not dispense of the need to de-
termine the applicable law, it was circular, indeterminate and insufficient, and 
its underlying policy was rejected. However, although the same bases have 
been brought forward against the country-of-origin principle, they have not 
had similar success. Indeed, it can be shown one by one how the country-of-
origin principle can refute the criticism. The main structural reason lies in the 
differences between the international legal scene of the vested rights theory 
and that of the EU with its country-of-origin principle. The main policy reason 
lies in the returned force of liberal positions. 
1. The Need to Determine the Applicable Law 
What, first, of the criticism that the vested rights theory does not make irrele-
vant the determination of the applicable law? The criticism is weak even 
against the vested rights theory when the creation of a right can clearly be es-
tablished. If a right has been created and need only be enforced, this enforce-
ment can be separated from the creation of the right. The same is true, and per-
haps more forcefully so, for the country-of-origin principle, which is not de-
signed as a method to determine the applicable law. The principle leaves the 
normal process of determination intact; it only provides constraints, alterations 
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regarding this process. This does not dispense with the need for the judge to 
first determine what the country-of-origin is, and then to examine whether the 
relevant party has complied with that country’s law. However, this is indeed a 
process more akin to the determination of a preliminary question than to an ac-
tual application of that law.  
2. Circularity 
The argument of circularity rests on the assumption that states retain mutual 
sovereignty and that the enforcement of foreign rights is a matter for sover-
eignty. If a superior set of norms can be found that restricts sovereignty and 
that requires states to recognize vested rights, the circularity claim falls apart, 
since then the duty to enforce these rights no longer arises from the foreign law 
that created them but rather from this superior norm whose binding force is 
beyond doubt. Critics have been all too ready to adopt Wächter’s criticism of 
circularity without realizing that, unlike Wächter, most authors proposing a 
more elaborate version of a vested rights theory assume the existence of such a 
higher set of norms:172 natural law,173 ius gentium,174 general common law,175 
customary international law,176 or simply a legally relevant principle of jus-
tice.177 Within a federal system like the US – or a Treaty based community of 
states like the EU – a constitution or a Treaty can easily furnish this set of 
norms. It is widely ignored that even Wächter himself admitted as much. Nor-
mally presented as the staunchest opponent of the vested rights theory, he ac-
cepted the theory’s validity regarding the relationship as between the different 
states within the German empire.178 
This suggests that the circularity argument is intrinsically linked to an idea 
about state sovereignty. This is why the criticism of circularity, so fatal with 
regard to the vested rights theory in private international law, loses its force 
with regard to the country-of-origin principle of European law. There is no 
doubt that EU law, both as primary law (in particular, the basic freedoms) and 
as secondary law (in particular, the directives based on the country-of-origin 
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principle) is a superior set of norms.179 The country of origin provides only the 
laws with which a provided must comply; the obligation for all other states to 
recognize the results of such compliance rests not on those laws but rather on a 
superior set of norms. The restriction of sovereignty within the European Un-
ion weakens the circularity argument. 
3. Indeterminacy 
The indeterminacy criticism – that the vested rights theory cannot provide cri-
teria for determining the applicable law – is harder to refute; it has some force 
against the country-of-origin principle, as well. That principle alone cannot de-
termine what counts as the country of origin; other criteria must be found. In-
deed, if the word “origin” is meant to conceal the fact that the choice of what 
counts as the country of origin is an actual political choice, the criticism is as 
strong here as against the vested rights theory. Why, for example, is the sup-
plier’s rather than the consumer’s state considered as the “country of origin”? 
Basedow’s own argument for favouring the supplier is that suppliers act as mo-
tors of European integration.180 The counterargument brought by others is that 
the costs saved by suppliers are merely shifted to consumers, so no efficiency 
gain is achieved.181 Both positions are different proposals for what should 
count as a connecting factor—their both being based on considerations of the 
European market. None of them is deduced from the notion of country of ori-
gin alone. 
This suggests that the country-of-origin principle, like the vested rights the-
ory, requires an additional method to determine which country should count as 
the country of origin. However, it suggests that such a method can be devel-
oped on the basis of the idea of the common market. Like the vested rights 
theory, the country-of-origin principle is indeterminate, but not intrinsically 
incoherent. 
4. Insufficiency 
What about the insufficiency argument that the country-of-origin principle 
cannot answer all questions as to what is the applicable law? It is indeed the 
case that the country-of-origin principle makes only rights, not liabilities and 
other restrictions binding. However, the reason for this limitation is that the 
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impetus behind the principle is to restrict barriers to trade in the form of legal 
relations, not to create legal regimes. Just as rights function as trumps over the 
objective law, to use Ronald Dworkin’s language, so the country of origin acts 
functions as a trump over the objective law, while leaving it intact in general. 
Properly understood, the country-of-origin principle enables a slight but 
important reformulation of the Günstigkeitsprinzip. The relationship between 
the country-of-origin law and the otherwise applicable law is not the relation 
between two different legal systems, where the law’s applicability is alterna-
tive: that of one system or the other. Rather, the relationship is a combination 
of a right, granted by the law of the country of origin, and a set of laws – those 
of the country of destination. The country-of-origin principle and traditional 
private international law together determine both the applicable law and its 
treatment of certain rights. Substituting the principle for traditional private in-
ternational law would thus go beyond what the common market requires and in 
fact beyond what makes sense in a common market. The restriction of the 
country-of-origin principle to limited questions of rights to provide services is 
an advantage rather than a disadvantage. 
5. Formalism 
The characterization of the country-of-origin principle as formal is apt. How-
ever, as criticism this characterization is less strong than it was against the 
vested rights theory. There are several reasons for this. First, we are currently 
observing a revived preference for formal over substantive connecting factors in 
the law. The reason is that formal rules are easier for parties to predict, and party 
expectations are considered more important than the regulatory interests of 
states. As a matter of fact, ignoring these regulatory interests prevents regulatory 
monopolies of the most-affected states. Second, formal factors, because they are 
easier to manipulate, enable parties to choose the laws applicable to them and 
may thereby further regulatory competition between member state laws as a de-
sirable path towards more efficient laws. One may oppose these policies that are 
used to justify the formalism of the country-of-origin principle, but such criti-
cism shifts the debate from one over form to one over substance. 
However, just as with the vested rights theory before, the alleged predict-
ability and ease of administration have limits. Where the county of origin can 
be determined easily, as with the registration of a company, predictability both 
as to that country and to the scope of applicable law can indeed be achieved. 
Where on the other hand no such formal act takes place, predictability is much 
harder to achieve. The Services Directive, to use one example, would have left 
a huge scope for debate as to the scope of its country-or-origin principle. 
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6. Policies 
Discussion of the formal character has already suggested that, since the logical 
and structural arguments are ultimately not fatal for the country-of-origin prin-
ciple, the policy arguments become the most important ones. Here we can see 
how the clash between traditional private international law and the European 
country-of-origin principle is transformed from a mere methodological clash to 
a clash of principle. Indeed, the central criticism brought forward against the 
vested rights theory reappears as the main justification for the country-of-
origin principle. If the vested rights theory is said to yield insufficiently to the 
policies of sovereign states, then this is a reason for the European Union to 
adopt it, or the equivalent country-of-origin principle. After all, to disregard 
certain policies of member states is a goal of the common market. Overcoming 
such policies is considered necessary for the benefit of the market participants. 
Such policy differences can account for the different connecting factors 
used by traditional private international law and the country-of-origin principle 
respectively. The country-of-origin principle, based as it is on a formal con-
necting factor, frequently designates a law different from the law with the 
closest connection, which traditional private international law would designate. 
This is not an accident, and it can therefore not be remedied by simple assimi-
lation of the factors in both approaches. Traditional private international law, 
in designating the applicable law, will frequently designate the legal order with 
the greatest regulatory interest, especially in the area of economic law, where 
most clashes occur. The country-of-origin principle, by contrast, will fre-
quently designate a legal order that is relatively uninterested in strong regula-
tion, especially of its exporters. Whereas traditional private international law 
may tend towards overregulation, the country-of-origin principle may counter 
this effect because it encourages underregulation.182 The combination of both 
may be most likely to achieve an efficient equilibrium. 
Similarly, the criticism that individuals are preferred over states can be 
turned into a supporting argument. If the assumption is correct that the member 
states are regulating more than what is good for its individual citizens, then the 
country-of-origin principle could also be justified in favouring the interests of 
individuals over the interests of states, especially those of the country of desti-
nation. This is in tune with Christian Joerges’ interpretation of the Centros de-
cision as one that gives citizens a right to hold their governments accountable 
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for their laws.183 Provided each member state complies with certain minimum 
requirements (a provision fulfiled through harmonization), it can be considered 
an undue burden for a supplier to have to comply with more than one law. 
Finally, the criticism that the vested rights theory and the country-of-origin 
principle favour one class of individuals over another without sufficient justifi-
cation can be countered, at least from a particular perspective. Take, for exam-
ple, a consumer contract. To critics, the passive consumer should be protected 
against the active supplier. His reliance on applicability on his home law must 
be protected, because he has not left his home. To proponents of the country-
of-origin principle, the active supplier must be protected against the passive 
consumer for the sake of the common market. The supplier is furthering the 
common market by his transnational conduct; this is worthy of support from a 
European perspective. The passive consumer must be turned into an active 
consumer, and the best way to do this is by taking away the legal advantages of 
passivity. Obviously, this policy clash cannot be resolved on the basis of ab-
stract and neutral principle. But it seems plausible to think that the consumer 
protection of traditional private international law is well balanced with a coun-
terweight. 
IV. Some Broader Insights 
We have seen that the country-of-origin principles is indeed best understood as 
a reinvigoration of the vested rights theory, and that both structural reasons of 
the European Union and current policy preferences protect the country-of-
origin principle against the criticism that brought he vested rights theory down. 
Now we can put these findings into a broader perspective. Four broader in-
sights emerge. 
A first insight from the comparison with the vested rights theory suggests 
the limits of a country-of-origin principle. The vested rights theory was suc-
cessful as long as it was not used as the exclusive approach to private interna-
tional law. Only when it was expanded, by Dicey and Beale, to cover all ques-
tions of private international law, the creation and non-creation of rights, it 
failed – first because it was badly suited for questions of non-creation of rights, 
second, because it functioned badly in situations where, absent a formal grant-
ing procedure, it was not clear whether a right had been granted or not. The 
country-of-origin principle would benefit from a similar restriction. First, it 
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should remain applicable only to the granting of rights or privileges, not the 
imposition of requirements. It is as badly suited for the general determination 
of the applicable law as the vested rights theory. Second, the principle works 
best where a clear formal act of granting takes place, like in the incorporation 
of a company, or the issuance of a licence. The informal creation of rights is 
better achieved through traditional private international law. 
A second insight goes the other way: Despite their similarity, the country-
of-origin principle and vested rights theory differ in important ways. The two 
share a common structure and fulfil similar functions, but the justifications for 
those structures and functions are quite different. The vested rights theory was 
justified by reference to a higher set of principles thought beyond political con-
trol – ius gentium, general international law, principles of justice. By contrast, 
EU law is based on economic and political considerations; while EU law is 
also a higher set of rules and principles, it is by no means beyond human con-
trol. The difference is important: Acceptance of the vested rights theory pre-
supposed only the conviction that a higher set of principles exist. Acceptance 
and scope of the country-of-origin principle, by contrast, presuppose a prior 
discussion of the appropriate economic and political goals to be served by the 
law. In consequence, discourse about private international law and its methods 
must become a discourse about economics and politics in order to remain 
meaningful. Because private international lawyers know the vested rights the-
ory, they should be well equipped for such debates, but they must be ready to 
lead them. The return of vested rights provides an excellent opportunity for 
such renewed debates. 
Third, the comparison with the country-of-origin principle with its openly 
political justification highlights the role that politics has played for the rise as 
for the fall of the vested rights theory. At the same time, in focusing on the rise 
and fall, the study should also have shown the value of historical analysis. The 
vested rights theory emerged from ideas of early liberalism: Individuals should 
have rights that the government cannot take away from them; in times of 
emerging commerce this protection could not be confined to innate rights, but 
had to be extended to acquired rights. By extension, in international trade such 
rights had to be protected against foreign governments. At its heart, the vested 
rights theory was thus a liberal theory that sought to protect a space of private 
ordering against the policies of the state, very much like the country-of-origin 
principle is based on liberal ideas of the predominance of the Common Market 
over the member states. This idea of protection of spaces against the state is 
still visible in reconceptions of rights theories of private international law, like 
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Lea Brilmayer’s theory of political rights.184 The theory predates the 19th cen-
tury; it is, rather, contemporaneous to the justification of subjective rights in 
post-medieval political thought. Nonetheless, it was in the 19th century that 
vested rights were first thought to be the exclusive basis for private interna-
tional law. These attempts failed like the underlying jurisprudential idea con-
ceiving of legal systems as mere regimes for the protection of rights: rights as 
the creation of state laws cannot simultaneously trump these laws. However, 
the rejection of the vested rights theory went beyond this point and now had an 
equally political flavor. The legal realists’ critique of rights came hand-in-hand 
with a rejection of the public / private distinction and an emphasis on state 
policies, finding its high point in the New Deal. The realists’ perspective that 
law was „really“ not about rights, but about state policies replaced one kind of 
essentialism with another. In short, the vested rights theory was a pre-national 
theory that broke down in the heyday of nationalism. Now that the European 
Union has brought about a post-national constellation in which states’ sover-
eignty is restricted again, it is not surprising that an equivalent of the vested 
rights theory is being reborn as well. 
More generally, history shows that both theories and their restrictions are 
rarely abstract truths but rather are contingent upon broader concepts – here 
concepts of law and sovereignty. In a model of international relations in which 
the state’s sovereignty determines everything, there is no place for a theory of 
vested rights. If no higher set of values exists that can bind the state, and if pri-
vate rights are considered entirely subject to the states’ determination, then all 
questions are questions of allocation of prescriptive sovereignty; vested rights 
that restrict this sovereignty have no role to play. Yet the common market is 
not such a world. There is a superior set of rules in EU law, and the restriction 
of state sovereignty is one of its declared goals for the benefit of the common 
market. 
A final, normative insight to be drawn from the history of these theories and 
from their criticism and its rebuttal applies to the future of private international 
law in general. Arguably, neither a pure focus on individual interests nor a 
pure focus on collective interests appears appropriate for private international 
law (or for any area of the law). This pluralism of interests is best served by a 
pluralism of methods. To base all private international law within the European 
Union on a country-of-origin principle would be folly. So would a total disre-
gard of the principle. Private international law in the European Union will re-
main a two-track endeavour,185 but this is its asset rather than its burden. The 
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country-of-origin principle and traditional, state-based, private international 
law are different techniques with different policies – one cannot be translated 
into the other. This is a blow for those who hope for a coherent system of pri-
vate international law. But it is encouraging for those who believe that internal 
tensions within a legal system are necessary for development. A two-track 
concept of conflict of laws can bring these tensions to the fore and thus enable 
us to formulate and address them. 
This lets us see the protests against the country-of-origin principle in France 
and the Netherlands in a new light. If private international lawyers recognize 
these protests an the struggles over the country-of-origin principles as elements 
in a debate that is central to the methods and the politics of their very own dis-
cipline, they may well use this as an opportunity for renewal in their very own 
field. This should be good news for European law, but it should be particularly 
good news for private international law. 
                                                                                                                                                      
law, the Savignyan multilateral approach from the unilateral approach of governmen-
tal interest analysis.  
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